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Over the last few years, the number of subpoenas issued to
journalists has risen dramatically. A flurry of high profile cases
involving such subpoenas1 has focused the public’s attention on
the merits of the reporter’s privilege. As a result, Congress is
considering federal shield law legislation, states are considering adopting or revising statutory shield laws, and courts
around the nation are grappling with the scope of the reporter’s
privilege under the First Amendment, common law, and state
statutes. In all of these contexts, one issue persists as a sticking
point: whether so-called “pajama-clad bloggers” should be entitled to invoke a reporter’s privilege. Some courts confronting
reporter’s privilege issues in cases involving traditional media
entities have been so worried about the expansive scope of the
privilege that they have been throwing the baby out with the
bathwater and refusing to recognize the privilege at all.2 Similarly, in Congress’s most recent attempt to pass a federal shield
law, the difficulty of defining who would be entitled to invoke
its protections proved to be a major stumbling block.3
When states first began recognizing a reporter’s privilege
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,4 defining
1. Mark Jurkowitz, Journalists Push for a State Shield Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2004, at D1 (discussing the ramifications of subpoenas issued
to Judy Miller and Matthew Cooper in the Valerie Plame investigation, to
various reporters in Wen Ho Lee’s Privacy Act case against the Government,
and to reporters who published information leaked from the BALCO steroid
grand jury investigation).
2. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964,
976–80 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (noting that the difficulties of
determining who qualifies as a reporter counsel against recognizing a First
Amendment or federal common law privilege and expressing special concern
about whether “the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the World Wide Web” would be entitled to invoke
the privilege); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 139–40 (D.D.C.
2005) (refusing to recognize a reporter’s privilege under federal common law in
part due to the difficulties of defining who qualifies as a reporter). Scholars
and media lawyers have expressed concern that the viability of the reporter’s
privilege is in danger if everyone can claim its protection. Floyd Abrams Explains Why He Should Lose, http://instapundit.com/archives/019677.php (Dec.
6, 2004, 12:44 EST) (“‘If everybody’s entitled to the privilege, nobody will get
it.’” (quoting renowned media attorney Floyd Abrams)).
3. See Posting of Declan McCullagh to News.Com, http://news.com.com/
2061-10796_3-5892666.html (Oct. 10, 2005, 16:20 PDT).
4. The first state shield law was enacted in Maryland on April 2, 1896, in
response to the imprisonment of a Baltimore Sun reporter for refusing to reveal a confidential source to a grand jury. Act of Apr. 2, 1896, ch. 249, 1896
Md. Laws 437 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (Lex-
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who was a member of the media entitled to invoke it was a
relatively easy task. Generally speaking, states limited the
privilege’s protections to full-time employees of established
mainstream media entities. Although in more recent decades
courts have been forced to consider the scope of the reporter’s
privilege in cases involving freelance reporters and book authors,5 the development of the Internet and online publications
have raised a host of new, perplexing questions about the purpose and scope of the privilege.
Courts have just begun to address cases involving nonprofessional journalists seeking the protections of the reporter’s
privilege. California courts recently confronted a case in which
Apple Computer sought to subpoena the names of sources and
documents relating to confidential information about a new
Apple product posted on two websites devoted to discussion of
Macintosh computers and related products.6 The trial court assumed, without deciding, that the website editors were journalists but held that the California shield law did not apply because they had divulged trade secrets.7 The appellate court
reversed, holding that the petitioners were covered under the
California shield law. The court rejected Apple’s arguments
that the petitioners were not engaged in “legitimate journalism” and that their websites did not constitute publications

isNexis 2002)); see also C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE
LAW § 15-1 (2d ed. 1999); Bruce L. Bortz & Laurie R. Bortz, “Pressing” Out the
Wrinkles in Maryland’s Shield Law for Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 461,
462 n.10 (1979). Other states followed suit in the 1930s. See, e.g., Act of Aug.
21, 1935, No. 253, 1935 Ala. Laws 649 (codified at ALA. CODE § 12-21-142
(LexisNexis 2005)); Act of Mar. 4, 1937, ch. 25, 1937 Ariz. Sess. Laws 45 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003)); Initiated Act No. 3, § 15, 1937
Ark. Acts 1391 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005)); Act of July 15,
1935, ch. 532, § 6, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1608, 1610 (currently codified at CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1070 (West 1995)); Act of Feb. 26, 1936, ch. 29, 1936 Ky. Acts 73 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005)); Act of May 12, 1933,
ch. 167, 1933 N.J. Laws 349 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
1994)); Act of June 25, 1937, no. 433, 1937 Pa. Laws 2123 (codified at 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2003)).
5. See infra Part III.
6. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1432 (Ct. App.
2006).
7. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL 578641,
at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (denying a request for a protective order),
rev’d sub nom. O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423.
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covered by the California shield law statute.8 Although the Apple case was the first to confront the applicability of the reporter’s privilege a website, it will not be the last.
State legislatures have also struggled to define who is entitled to shield law protection. Although over thirty states have
shield laws, most states need to update their statutes to reflect
the changing nature of journalism and the technology used to
publish it. Statutory shield laws often limit their application to
people who have a professional affiliation with a media entity
or require “regular” employment as a journalist, and some laws
even exclude broadcast and electronic media. In the Apple case,
for example, the appellate court was forced to engage in an extensive statutory analysis of the California shield law in order
to hold that an online publication constituted a “newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication” entitled to protection, because the state law had not been amended since 1974,
long before Internet publications existed.9
The difficulties new media pose for defining who should be
entitled to invoke a reporter’s privilege should not doom the
privilege’s very existence. The struggle to define who should be
entitled to claim the privilege is not new; the development of
the Internet as a new medium of communication poses many of
the same challenges to the scope of the reporter’s privilege that
state legislatures and state and federal courts have been grappling with ever since the privilege was first recognized. Courts
have struggled in past years with cases involving pay-per-view
wrestling commentators,10 investigative book authors,11 freelance writers,12 documentary filmmakers,13 academics,14 and
8. See O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1456–58 (quoting Real Party in Interest, Apple Computer, Inc.’s Response to Briefs of Amici Curiae (1) Jack M.
Balkin et al., (2) The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al., (3)
Bear Flag League, and (4) United States Internet Industry Association and
NetCoalition at 5, O’Grady, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (No. H028579), 2006 WL
2155499).
9. See id. at 1459–66 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070(a) (West 1995)).
10. See Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys. (In re Madden), 151 F.3d
125, 126–27 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the privilege was not applicable).
11. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a qualified reporter’s privilege applied to an author’s newsgathering
resources); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 138–40, 147 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that the privilege was not applicable).
12. See People v. Von Villas, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 78–79 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a California statutory privilege applied to an individual who had
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independent research consultants,15 concluding more often
than not that such individuals are entitled to invoke the privilege. Because state shield laws have existed since 1896,16
throughout the last century state legislators have often had to
decide whether to expand the scope of shield laws beyond
“newsmen” working on daily papers to people working in magazines, television, and radio.17
This history of the reporter’s privilege demonstrates that
the medium of communication should not determine whether
the privilege should apply. Instead, the focus must be on the
underlying purposes for the privilege: increasing the amount of
information in the public domain without turning all of those
who engage in such an enterprise into investigators for the
government and private parties.18 Given this broad conception
been a freelance author for thirteen years); Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321, 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the Indiana
statutory shield law did not apply to a freelance reporter who was not working
for the television station and collected information out of a personal interest in
environmental issues).
13. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436–37 (10th Cir.
1977) (holding that a privilege applied to a documentary filmmaker whose
“mission in this case was to carry out investigative reporting for use in the
preparation of a documentary film,” who had “spent considerable time and effort in obtaining facts and information of the subject matter in this lawsuit,”
and whose intention was “to make use of this in preparation of the film”).
14. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that professors are entitled to invoke a First Amendment reporter’s
privilege); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that an academic researcher cannot assert a reporter’s privilege when the
identity of a confidential source is not at issue).
15. See Summit Tech., Inc. v. Healthcare Capital Group, Inc., 141 F.R.D.
381, 384 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that an independent research consultant
was “engaged in the dissemination of investigative information to the investing business community” on “matters of public concern,” and was therefore
“entitled to raise the claim of privilege . . . as would any other media reporter,”
but explicitly not deciding “[w]hether or not [the consultant] is a member of
the ‘organized press’ per se” (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985))).
16. See supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 30, 1960, ch. 116, 1960 Ariz. Sess. Laws 241
(codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003)) (amending the law to
cover broadcast as well as print media); Act of Mar. 20, 1952, ch. 121, 1952 Ky.
Acts 313 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005)) (adding
radio and television as protected media).
18. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (cautioning that the majority opinion “annex[es] the press as an investigative arm [for the government]”).
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of the purpose behind the reporter’s privilege, the privilege
should not be limited to those who are serving as traditional
journalists; rather, it should extend to anyone who is contributing to the marketplace of ideas by disseminating information to
the public.
Most courts and commentators considering the issue have
expressed deep concern about the notion that bloggers19 and
other citizen journalists should be entitled to the privilege.20 As
a result, these courts and commentators have developed awkward, difficult-to-implement rules in an effort to limit the class
of those entitled to invoke the privilege. These various approaches, however, are all fundamentally flawed,21 and, more
importantly, fail to reconceptualize the scope of the privilege in
light of the expanding number of individuals and entities entitled to its protections.22
It is neither possible nor prudent to limit a reporter’s privilege to professional journalists. Instead, a qualified privilege
should apply to anyone disseminating information to the public
who is called to testify in a judicial or administrative proceeding. In addition, the legal system should adopt several exceptions to the privilege to cover those circumstances in which
countervailing societal interests outweigh any societal interest
in preserving the privilege. These exceptions should include the
following situations: (1) when the subpoena is directed to someone who witnessed or participated in criminal or tortious activity (the definition of crime, however, should exclude “leaks” of
classified or national security information); (2) when a direct
and imminent threat to national security warrants compelling
testimony; and (3) when the subpoena is directed to someone
who engaged in publication solely in an effort to avoid a subpoena. In addition, plaintiffs suing an individual who dissemi-

19. Defining what counts as a “blog” is not an easy task. Some say that a
blog has three main features: the postings appear in reverse chronological order, the content is unfiltered, and it permits comments from readers. See, e.g.,
Posting of Michael Conniff to Online Journalism Review, Just What Is a Blog,
Anyway?, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/050929/print.htm (Sept. 29, 2006). In
addition, a blog often contains links to other websites and copies of text from
other sources. Id. But many websites considered to be blogs do not contain all
of these features, and many commentators have argued that a comprehensive
definition is neither possible nor necessary. Id.
20. See supra note 2; infra Part III.C.1.
21. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
22. See infra Part III.C.

PAPANDREA_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 9:57:45 AM

CITIZEN JOURNALISM

521

nates information to the public (or that individual’s publisher)
should first be required to survive a motion to dismiss, as well
as to demonstrate the importance of the testimony and the inability to obtain the information from alternative sources. This
safeguard would protect against frivolous defamation suits
brought solely to obtain a source’s identity.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF JOURNALISM
In many ways, the definition of “journalism” has now come
full circle. When the First Amendment was adopted, “freedom
of the press” referred quite literally to the freedom to publish
using a printing press, rather than the freedom of organized
entities engaged in the publishing business.23 The printers of
1775 did not exclusively publish newspapers; instead, in order
to survive financially, they dedicated most of their efforts to
printing materials for paying clients.24 The newspapers and
pamphlets of the American Revolutionary era were predominantly partisan and their successors became even more so
through the turn of the century. These publications engaged in
little newsgathering and instead were principally vehicles for
opinion.25
The term “journalism” passed into common usage in the
1830s, at roughly the same time that newspapers, using highspeed rotary steam presses, began mass circulation throughout
the eastern United States.26 Using the printing press, publishers could distribute exact copies to large numbers of readers at
a low incremental cost.27 In addition, the rapidly increasing
demand for advertising brand-name products fueled the creation of publications subsidized in large part by advertising
revenue.28 It was not until the late nineteenth century that the
concept of the “press” morphed into a description of individuals
and companies engaged in an often competitive commercial
23. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446–47
(2002).
24. TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT 11 (1990).
25. See id. (describing the growth of the partisan press during the American Revolution).
26. John E. Newhagen & Mark R. Levy, The Future of Journalism in a
Distributed Communication Architecture, in THE ELECTRONIC GRAPEVINE:
RUMOR, REPUTATION, AND REPORTING IN THE NEW ON-LINE ENVIRONMENT 9,
12 (Diane L. Borden & Kerric Harvey eds., 1998).
27. Id. at 12–13.
28. Anderson, supra note 23, at 447.
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media enterprise.29 For most of the twentieth century, professional journalists working in television, radio, and print media
dominated the gathering and dissemination of news and information.
The Supreme Court has often recognized the important
role the mainstream media plays in our democracy. In 1931 the
Court commented in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson that the
growing complexity of government and concomitant opportunities for crime and malfeasance “emphasize[ ] the primary need
of a vigilant and courageous press.”30 In Estes v. Texas, the
Court noted that the press “has been a mighty catalyst in
awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing
corruption among public officers and employees and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences.”31 The
First Amendment, the Court has said, helps “preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information.”32 In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court recognized
the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,”33 and accordingly held that even false statements about
public officials were constitutionally protected absent evidence
that the statements were made with actual malice.34
At the same time, the Court has rejected arguments of the
institutional press that its role as the “fourth estate,” with its
unique abilities to gather and disseminate news about matters
of public concern, entitled it to special constitutional protection.35 Since the 1970s the Court has routinely rejected claims
that the press was entitled to any special First Amendment
protections that the public at large did not equally enjoy.36
29. See id.
30. 283 U.S. 697, 719–20 (1931).
31. 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
32. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
33. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
34. Id. at 279–80.
35. See GLEASON, supra note 24, at 4–6 (citing case law, attorneys, and
journalism literature for the contention that the institutional press is “the 4th
Estate” and an “independent watchdog[ ]”).
36. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81
(1980) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a “public” right of access to criminal trials, rather than a right of the press); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11
(1978) (plurality opinion) (stating that the media has no right of “special access to information not available to the public generally” (quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972))); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
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Perhaps the Court’s reluctance to hold that the press has
special constitutional rights was remarkably (although unintentionally) prescient. As means of communication become
more interactive and accessible to the public, the “press” of the
twenty-first century is rapidly becoming more difficult to define.37 With the traditional media of newspapers, radio, and
television, there was a natural physical limit to the space and
time available for individual participation. With the Internet,
these spatial and temporal barriers no longer exist. As a result,
more people are able to contribute their ideas and opinions to
the public discourse.38 The numbers of people contributing information on the Internet have been rapidly expanding. The
number of blogs (and blog-readers) has jumped dramatically in
the last few years. At last count, there were roughly 34.5 million blogs, and the number increases every day.39 Technorati.com, which tracks trends in the “blogosphere,” reports
that 75,000 new blogs are created daily, roughly one every second.40
One main reason blogs have proliferated is the absence of
barriers to entry: a website can be created in minutes at little
or no cost. Blogs cover every sort of imaginable issue. Although
many of these millions of blogs are simply online diaries, political blogs are some of the most popular and well-known contributors to the public debate. Some blogs provide readers with
original research; others consist primarily of categorized and
digested links to other news sources. One of the benefits of
some blogs is that readers are able to hear directly from experts
who would ordinarily be quoted by mainstream media. In addition, the creativity, knowledge, and expertise of bloggers often
dwarf that of journalists in traditional media outlets.41
(1974) (rejecting the claim that the press is entitled to a greater right of access
than the general public); see also Anderson, supra note 23, at 449–50 (noting
that, by the 1970s, the Supreme Court refused to recognize special rights under the Press Clause).
37. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1-04-CV-032178, 2005 WL
578641, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005), rev’d sub nom. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1432 (Ct. App. 2006).
38. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J.
1805, 1846–47 (1995).
39. Posting of Dave Sifry to Technorati, State of the Blogosphere, April
2006 Part I: Blogosphere Growth, http://www.technorati.com/weblog/2006/04/
96.html (Apr. 17, 2006).
40. Id.
41. See Daniel W. Drezner & Henry Farrell, The Power and Politics of
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The influence of blogs on both the traditional mainstream
media and the public discourse cannot be overestimated.
Online contributors have broken a number of stories that the
mainstream media originally either ignored or downplayed.
Matt Drudge, author of the controversial online Drudge Report,
has led the way in providing influential Internet journalism.42
Although Drudge does not consider himself a journalist—in
fact, he bristles at the suggestion43—his blog revealed that
Newsweek had pulled a story reporting on President Clinton’s
affair with Monica Lewinsky.44 Drudge also was the first to report that Bob Dole had chosen Jack Kemp as his running mate
in the 1996 presidential election, that Newsweek had withheld
a story that Clinton had fondled White House staff member
Kathleen Willey, and that CBS had fired Connie Chung.45
Blogs have continued to drive the national conversation.
The mainstream media did not pick up on Mississippi Senator
Trent Lott’s controversial comments at Strom Thurmond’s onehundredth birthday celebration; instead blogger Atrios, Joshua
Micah Marshall on TalkingPointsMemo.com, and University of
Tennessee law professor Glenn Reynolds on Instapundit.com
pressed the issue until the mainstream media paid attention
and Lott resigned his position as Senate Majority Leader.46
Several blogs, including Buckhead, InstaPundit, Little Green
Blogs, Presentation at the 2004 American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting 4, 16 (July 2004), available at http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~farrell/
blogpaperfinal.pdf.
42. See Todd S. Purdum, The Dangers of Dishing Dirt in Cyberspace, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at E3.
43. See id.
44. The Drudge Report broke this story on January 17, 1998. Seth Schiesel, Cyberspace Is on Alert for More Scandal News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998,
at A14. Soon thereafter Newsweek published its report, and the road to Clinton’s impeachment hearings began. Howard Fineman & Karen Breslau, Sex,
Lies and the President, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 20.
45. Howard Kurtz, Clinton Scoop So Hot It Melted, WASH. POST, Jan. 22,
1998, at C1; Purdum, supra note 42.
46. Oliver Burkeman, Bloggers Catch What the Washington Post Missed,
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 21, 2002, at 13, available at http://www.guardian.co
.uk/international/story/0,3604,863964,00.html; Paul Krugman, The Other
Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A39 (“Joshua Marshall, whose
talkingpointsmemo.com is must reading for the politically curious, . . . [is,]
more than anyone else, . . . responsible for making Trent Lott’s offensive
remarks the issue they deserve to be.”); Drezner & Farrell, supra note 41, at 3;
Noah Shactman, Blogs Make the Headlines, WIRED, Dec. 23, 2004, http://www
.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,56978,00.html.
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Footballs, Powerline, and TalkingPointsMemo are credited for
pressing the investigation into the authenticity of CBS news
anchor Dan Rather’s documents concerning President George
W. Bush’s National Guard service.47 Bloggers also forced the
mainstream media to acknowledge and assess questions raised
by a group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth regarding Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry’s military service in
Vietnam.48 In July 2005, bloggers pointed out that the mainstream media gave significantly more coverage to the disappearance of white women than to minorities and pressured cable news outlets to cover the disappearance of a young black
pregnant woman in Philadelphia with the same depth as they
did the murder of Laci Peterson.49 In January 2006, bloggers
revealed that James Frey fictionalized significant portions of
his memoir.50 The blog stopsexpredators.com was the first to
reveal the contents of inappropriate e-mails former Representative Mark Foley sent to House pages.51
Many have argued that the rise of bloggers is due in no
small part to the public’s diminished confidence in mainstream
journalism, which has been plagued by scandals for the last
several years.52 A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press revealed that fifty-three percent of Americans do not trust what they hear and read in the
news.53 Another survey showed that only thirty-three percent
47. Jonathan V. Last, What Blogs Have Wrought, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept.
27, 2004, at 27 available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_
preview.asp?idArticle=4640&R=ED37D7; see also Marianne M. Jennings,
Where Are Our Minds and What Are We Thinking? Virtue Ethics for a Perfidious Media, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 637, 693 (2005) (discussing the bloggers’ role in “Dan Rather’s Memogate”).
48. Gene Edward Veith & Lynn Vincent, Year of the Blog, 19 WORLD
MAG., Dec. 4, 2004, http://www.worldmag.com/articles/10018.
49. Allison Keyes, Bloggers Gain Attention for Missing Woman, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO, July 29, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=4776486.
50. Tom Zeller, Jr., Link by Link: Before the Fame, a Million Little Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at C3.
51. See Peter Hamby, Mysterious Blog Scooped Media on Foley Message,
CNN.COM, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/04/foley
.internet.
52. See Thomas J. Johnson & Barbara K. Kaye, Wag the Blog: How Reliance on Traditional Media and the Internet Influence Credibility Perceptions of
Weblogs Among Blog Users, 81 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 622, 624–25
(2004).
53. THE PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, NEWS AUDI-
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believe that “the news media tries to report the news without
bias.”54 Critics complain that media conglomerations are too
close to the corporations and politicians they cover to be trusted
as watchdogs.55 Some point to the widespread failure of the
press to challenge the Bush Administration’s rush to war in
Iraq as proof positive that mainstream journalists have fallen
down on the job.56
Perhaps what is most revolutionary about Internet journalism is that it is often interactive. Although the first blogs (like
the Drudge Report) most often simply posted links to other
mainstream media websites, over time bloggers began to offer
their own insights and commentary.57 More recently, many
blogs have become interactive by permitting their readers to
respond with their own comments, criticism, and information.58
Indeed, it was the readers and outside contributors to blogs
who uncovered that Dan Rather’s documents about Bush’s National Guard service were forged.59 The interactive nature of
the Internet permitted hundreds, if not thousands, of experts to
use computers to coordinate their activities and findings like a
network of virtual detectives on a case.60
Blogging is only one facet of the new journalism that has
developed in recent years. Other forms of “citizen journalism”61
publications, compiling contributions from ordinary people,
have also proliferated. These online publications run the gamut
from those with editors suggesting story ideas and reviewing
contributions for style, grammar, and content, to those with no
editors at all.62 For example, Backfence.com, the brainchild of a
former Washington Post journalist, provides residents of DisENCES INCREASINGLY POLARIZED (2004), http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportID=215.
54. Rachel Smolkin, A Source of Encouragement, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 30, 31.
55. See Barb Palser, Journalism’s Backseat Drivers, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 43, 43.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Veith & Vincent, supra note 48.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. There are many other names for this new form of journalism, including “open source journalism,” “citizen media,” “we media,” “participatory media,” and “networked journalism.”
62. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, This Just in: Do-It-Yourself Journalism
Spreads on Web, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2005, at A14.
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trict of Columbia suburbs with a public forum on issues such as
the best plumber in town, new housing developments, and
school plays.63 Contributors agree to abide by certain guidelines, such as telling the truth, respecting others’ privacy, and
limiting indecent or offensive language, but stories are not edited.64 The Melrose Mirror, an Internet publication and creation
of MIT’s Media Lab, is written and edited by a staff of senior
citizens in Melrose, Massachusetts.65 The website and weekly
newspaper Your Mom has only one staff member who is a journalist; about forty unpaid teenagers draft all the content, which
is edited only for indecency and profanity.66 In contrast, at New
West, an online newspaper that covers a wide range of issues in
the Rocky Mountain area, a full slate of editors reviews contributions from citizen editors before publication.67 New West
seeks to compete directly with the mainstream media.68
Other experiments with citizen or participatory journalism
are larger in scope and focus on a broad range of political, social, and economic issues. In South Korea, the OhMyNews website claims over thirty-nine thousand ordinary citizens as contributors and is credited with helping Roh Moo Hyun win that
nation’s presidency.69 Wikimedia is an umbrella company that
houses several collaborative online ventures, including the
four-year-old Wikipedia, which contains more than 1.5 million
encyclopedia-style articles and almost three million registered
users.70 Wikinews is a more recent project that began in December 2004.71 It aims to use collaborative reporting from its

63. Backfence.com, About Backfence, http://www.backfence.com/about/
index.cfm?page=/members/aboutUs&mycomm=MC (last visited Nov. 30,
2006).
64. Backfence.com, Community Rules, http://www.backfence.com/about/
index.cfm?page=/members/commRules&mycomm=MC (last visited Nov. 30,
2006).
65. Melrose Mirror Front Page, http://melrosemirror.media.mit.edu (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006).
66. Cha, supra note 62.
67. Id.; see also New West Network, About New West, http://newwest.net/
index.php/plain/entry/13/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
68. Cha, supra note 62.
69. Id.
70. Wikipedia, Statistics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics
(last visited Nov. 30, 2006); see also Aaron Weiss, The Unassociated Press,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at G5.
71. Wikinews, http://www.wikinews.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
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users to summarize the news on all subjects.72 The policy guidelines for Wikinews emphasize neutrality, and all editing
mechanisms are designed to be completely transparent.73 At
any time a user can compose a new article or edit an existing
one and see the trail of prior edits.74 The project founders hope
that the readers and contributors will serve as fact-checkers
and promote the accuracy of the articles.75
Many have been quick to argue that bloggers and other
citizen journalists are not actually engaged in journalism.
Elizabeth Osder, a visiting professor at the University of
Southern California’s School of Journalism, stated that
“[b]loggers are navel-gazers” who are “about as interesting as
friends who make you look at their scrap books.”76 Echoing the
most common criticism of bloggers, she added that blogs consist
of “opinion without expertise, without resources, without
reporting.”77 Another journalist complained that “[a] professional journalist’s No. 1 obligation is to be accurate. A citizen
journalist’s No. 1 obligation is to be interesting.”78 David Shaw
of the Los Angeles Times said that unlike traditional journalists, who must pass their work through layers of filters before
publication, bloggers thrive on dispensing unfiltered, raw information to the public.79 He charges that “[m]any bloggers—
not all, perhaps not even most—don’t seem to worry much
about being accurate. Or fair. They just want to get their opinions—and their ‘scoops’—out there as fast as they pop into their
brains.”80 Another scholar has noted that the low costs involved
in setting up a blog “reduce[] the quality of each individual blog
as compared with traditional media, and can make it hard for
readers to find the accurate blogs or identify the inaccurate
ones.”81
72. See Wikinews, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikinews (follow “Mission Statement” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
73. See id. (follow “Ensuring Neutrality” and “Article Stages” hyperlinks).
74. See id. (follow “Article Stages” hyperlink).
75. See id. (follow “Frequently Asked Questions” hyperlink).
76. Shactman, supra note 46.
77. Id.
78. Fred Brown, ‘Citizen’ Journalism Is Not Professional Journalism,
QUILL, Aug. 2005, at 42, 42.
79. See David Shaw, Media Matters: Do Bloggers Deserve Basic Journalistic Protections?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at E14.
80. Id.
81. Larry E. Ribstein, Initial Reflections on the Law and Economics of

PAPANDREA_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 9:57:45 AM

CITIZEN JOURNALISM

529

In response, citizen journalists are quick to point out that
their mistakes are corrected as quickly as they are posted. Jeff
Jarvis, a blogger on Buzzmachine.com, told a Wall Street Journal reporter that “[w]hen I make a mistake, people jump on me
like white blood cells on a germ. If I don’t correct it, my reputation’s going to suffer.”82 One scholar argued that the blogosphere capitalizes on what James Surowiecki has labeled
“the wisdom of crowds”83 by drawing on the expertise and
knowledge of literally millions of people.84 In addition, the low
costs of operating a website allow those with very specific interests to publish material that might be too narrowly focused
for more traditional media.85
A recent Wikipedia scandal involving the defamation of a
former journalist has led many to question the reliability of
open-source journalism,86 but the many defamation lawsuits
filed against major media companies demonstrate that online
publications do not have a monopoly on error.87 Furthermore, a
recent analysis by the journal Nature concluded that Wikipedia’s scientific entries had an average of four “inaccuracies” (defined as factual errors, critical omissions, or misleading statements) per entry as compared with Encyclopedia Britannica’s
three errors per entry.88 This study demonstrates that Wikipedia’s error rate may not be significantly greater than that of a
publication whose content is provided by paid experts.89

Blogging 3 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 25, 2005); see also
CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 56–60, 75–77 (2001) (expressing concern that
the growth of the new media will fracture the common discourse).
82. Jessica Mintz, When Bloggers Make News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2005,
at B1.
83. See JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xi–xxi (2004).
84. Ribstein, supra note 81, at 7.
85. Id.
86. See John Seigenthaler, A False Wikipedia ‘Biography,’ USA TODAY,
Nov. 30, 2005, at A11 (criticizing Wikipedia for allowing the publication of a
biography of Seigenthaler that falsely stated that he was involved with the
Kennedy assassinations).
87. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Boston Herald Is Told to Pay $2 Million for Libel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2005, at A10; Reed Irvine & Cliff Kincaid, Costly
Tailwind Bedevils CNN, MEDIA MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1999, http://www.aim.org/
media_monitor/3231_0_2_0_C/.
88. Gregory M. Lamb, Online Wikipedia Is Not Britannica—But It’s Close,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 5, 2006, at 13.
89. Id.
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In addition, even mainstream journalism publications are
regarded with different levels of trust. Readers may trust the
Los Angeles Times more than they trust the National Enquirer,
but the reporters working for either publication equally claim
the title of “journalist.” Courts have long resisted attempts to
segregate the media into tiers based on perceived quality or
trustworthiness.90 At the same time, it is important to keep in
mind that defamatory statements are actionable as long as a
plaintiff can prove the appropriate level of fault.91 Although the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) protects Internet service
providers against lawsuits,92 it does not shelter primary content providers like bloggers and other citizen journalists from
defamation claims.93 This threat of litigation, with its attendant costs and inconvenience, has a “civilizing influence”94 on
Internet communications by improving the quality of the discourse.95
Despite its criticism of bloggers, the mainstream media
have found themselves borrowing from the blogger’s bag of
tricks.96 Many reporters have their own blogs.97 Newsweek has

90. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 905–07 (2000).
91. See id. at 905–15 (discussing the standards applicable to Internet
speech); see also Eric P. Robinson, Libel and Related Lawsuits Against Bloggers, MEDIA L. RES. CTR., Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.medialaw.org/
Content/Navigation-Menu/Member_Resources/Litigation_Resources/
Materials_by_Issue/Lawsuits_Against_Bloggers/Lawsuits_Against_Bloggers
.htm (compiling a list of lawsuits against bloggers).
92. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).
93. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997)
(noting that nothing in the CDA permits the “original culpable party who
posts defamatory messages [to] . . . escape accountability”; instead, it simply
prevents plaintiffs from “imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages”); see also Lidsky, supra note 90, at 868–72 (explaining that under the CDA, an allegedly
defamed plaintiff must sue the originator of the defamatory statements).
94. Lidsky, supra note 90, at 886.
95. Id. at 885–92 (explaining how litigation chills speech on the Internet).
96. For a list of sample blogs supported by mainstream media outlets, see
Matt Welch, The Media Go Blogging, in Blogworld and Its Gravity, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 21, 23. This list includes, among many
others, the Boston Globe, the Christian Science Monitor, the New Republic, the
Wall Street Journal, ABC, FOX, and MSNBC.
97. See Cyberjournalist.net, J-Blog List, http://www.cyberjournalist.net/
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teamed with blog-tracker Technorati to provide direct links to
comments bloggers are making about Newsweek’s stories
(which appear both online and in print).98 In January 2006, the
New York Times launched “The Opinionator,” a blog featured
on the online version of its opinion page, that provides links to
surveys and blogs as well as daily responses to opinion blogs.99
The site gives roughly equal weight and treatment to the views
of major bloggers and those of the editorial pages of major
American newspapers.100 In May 2006, the Associated Press
(AP) teamed up with Technorati to make blogger commentary
on AP news stories available to AP member websites.101
Several newspapers have been rapidly embracing the concept of citizen journalism by encouraging ordinary members of
the public to contribute stories for publication. In London, the
Guardian and the BBC actively seek photographs and video
images of newsworthy events from their readers, and other
mainstream media outlets are poised to follow their lead.102
Soon after the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks in London, cell
phone images taken by commuters dominated the news coverage.103 CNN followed suit and encouraged viewers to submit
pictures and video images of Hurricane Dennis, and many
submissions ultimately ended up on CNN’s website.104 Executives at CBS and ABC report that they are also working on
ways to make it easier for viewers to submit content for publication.105 As a start, NBC has given camera phones to all of its

cyberjournalists.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (listing blogs posted on mainstream media websites or by journalists independently).
98. Cyberjournalist.net, Online News, http://www.cyberjournalist.net/
news/002787.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (noting Newsweek’s new feature).
99. See The Opinionator, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com (last visited
Nov. 30, 2006).
100. See id.
101. Posting of Peter Hirshberg to Technorati, http://technorati.com/
weblog/2006/05/107.html (May 23, 2006).
102. See Daithi O Hanluain, Forget F-Stops: These Cameras Have Area
Codes, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2003, at G1; Joe Light, Lessons of the Internet Age:
Citizen Journalism Shows How Firms Have Learned to Quickly Embrace New
Technologies, BOSTON GLOBE, July 16, 2005, at A13.
103. Torin Douglas, How 7/7 ‘Democratised’ the Media, BBC NEWS, July 4,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5142702.stm.
104. Light, supra note 102.
105. Id.
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staff members—not just the journalists—in case they happen to
come across a news story.106
Some mainstream media entities are using citizen journalists to provide not just visual footage but also written content.
In November 2006, Gannett, which owns ninety newspapers
around the country, announced that not only was it officially
merging its online and print staffers—the first mainstream
media institution to take such a step—but it was also planning
to use “non-journalists” to develop content for its publications.107 Gannett announced these radical changes as part of a
conscious effort to boost its circulation numbers by capitalizing
on the popularity of blogs and community e-mail groups.108 The
Denver Post also publishes reader-contributed stories and photographs in local print editions.109
Although for the last hundred years professional journalists have been the primary purveyors of information to the public, this function is not one that has historically belonged exclusively to them. Journalism evolved in the past century with the
development of radio and television; the invention of the Internet can easily be seen as just another, albeit more revolutionary, step in this process.
II. SOURCES AND CONTOURS OF
THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE
Given the growing reluctance of courts to recognize a reporter’s privilege, no discussion of who might be entitled to invoke the privilege can begin without an explanation of its history, purpose, and current scope. This section will demonstrate
that despite the popular perception that the reporter’s privilege
is dying a slow (or not-so-slow) death, the reports of the privilege’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Over thirty states have
statutory shield laws, and no efforts are underway to repeal
them. In fact, in 2006 the State of Connecticut passed its first
statutory shield law.110 In addition, although the existence of
106. Id.
107. See Frank Ahrens, Gannett to Change Its Papers’ Approach, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2006, at D1.
108. See id.
109. James Nash, Papers Preparing Web Innovations, L.A. BUS. J., July 25,
2005, at 17.
110. Act of June 6, 2006, No. 06-140, 2006 Conn. Pub. Acts 140 (effective
Oct. 1, 2006); see also Editorial, An Important Media Moment, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 22, 2006, at A6.
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First Amendment privilege in the context of grand jury proceedings appears questionable, many circuits continue to recognize a First Amendment privilege in the context of criminal
and civil proceedings, and a federal common law privilege is
gaining traction. Furthermore, although the Judith Miller fiasco managed to turn public opinion against the existence of a
reporter’s privilege, other recent revelations based on secret
sources demonstrate that the public’s interest in the privilege is
stronger than ever.
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE
1. History of the Privilege
Journalists have been asserting their right to keep their
sources confidential since colonial times, long before judicial or
statutory recognition of any such right. Benjamin Franklin’s
brother was imprisoned in 1732 when he refused to divulge to a
legislative commission the name of the author of an article in
his newspaper.111 In 1734, John Peter Zenger refused to reveal
the names of his sources when he was accused of libeling the
Governor of New York and was jailed for a month (he was later
tried and acquitted).112 In 1812, Congress issued a contempt citation to an editor for the Alexandria Herald who refused to
identify the sources of a news story.113 The first reported case
concerning an asserted reporter’s privilege was in 1848, when a
court upheld the Senate’s contempt citation for New York Herald reporter John Nugent.114 Nugent had refused to disclose
who had given him a copy of a draft of a proposed treaty to end
the Mexican-American War that the Senate was then secretly
debating.115 A New York Times correspondent refused to comply
with a House committee’s request for the names of the Con111. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 69 (Leonard W. Labaree et al.
eds., Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1793).
112. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 37–45 (1985).
113. See Peri Z. Hansen, “According to an Unnamed Official”: Reconsidering the Consequences of Confidential Source Agreements When Promises Are
Broken by the Press, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 115, 125 (1992).
114. See Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 493 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375).
For one month, Nugent spent his days locked in a committee room in the Senate and his nights at the home of the Senate’s Sergeant at Arms. The Senate
eventually released him for “health reasons.” Mark Bowden, Lowering My
Shield, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July–Aug. 2004, at 24, 28.
115. See Nugent, 18 F. Cas. at 471–72.
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gressmen who had told him that some House members were
taking bribes.116 Throughout the nineteenth century, similar
cases involving legislative and judicial subpoenas to journalists
arose with some frequency.117
In early cases, journalists asserted a wide-variety of legal
grounds for protecting their sources. Some argued that revealing their sources would violate the ethical cannon of journalism
or offend their employers’ regulations.118 Others were even
more creative, suggesting that the subpoena offended their
right against self-incrimination119 or constituted an unjustified
“forfeiture of an estate.”120 A handful of journalists argued that
the press clause of either the federal or state constitution protected them against forced disclosure.121 The courts unanimously rejected these arguments, claiming that the rule of law
must prevail over ethical rules.122
Moreover, courts were slow to recognize any sort of constitutional or common law reporter’s privilege. Instead, state legislatures led the way with the adoption of statutory shield laws.
In 1896, Maryland became the first state to pass such a law, in
reaction to the jailing of a Baltimore Sun reporter who refused
to disclose to a grand jury the identity of the source who had
provided information regarding that body’s confidential proceedings.123 Although it took until 1933 for another state to
116. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5426, at 715 (1980).
117. See CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 21–25 (1973).
118. See id. at 36 (noting that in 1933 a reporter for the Philadelphia Record refused to testify in a civil proceeding about his source for a story regarding a secret hearing of the State Alcohol Permit Board on the ground that testifying could cost him his job; he was not required to testify).
119. See United States v. Burdick, 211 F. 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev’d,
236 U.S. 79 (1915); WHALEN, supra note 117, at 35–36 (noting that George
Burdick and William Curtin of the New York Tribune pleaded the Fifth
Amendment as the basis for their refusal to divulge their sources for a frontpage story reporting that a wealthy former congressman and his wife were
under investigation for smuggling jewels into the country).
120. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (Ga. 1911) (rejecting a
reporter’s argument that to reveal a police source would “cause him the forfeiture of an estate, to wit, it would cause him to lose his means of earning a livelihood” (quoting the reporter’s argument)).
121. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 116, § 5426, at 716.
122. See, e.g., People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226, 230 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1874); see also Talbot D’Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection
of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 317 (1969).
123. Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources
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adopt a shield law, from that point onward the number of similar statutes increased dramatically.124 The issue of reporters
preserving the confidentiality of their sources came to the forefront during the Great Depression, when the publication of stories on municipal corruption and labor unrest brought reporters to the witness stand and prompted several states to adopt
statutory protections for reporters.125 In at least one state, the
adoption of a shield law was regarded as a necessary component of a larger criminal law reform, based on the hope that
with this new protection reporters would be more willing to
publish stories revealing criminal activity.126 The states’ enthusiasm for shield laws suggests that such laws enhance rather
than detract from the ability of law enforcement to fight crime.
Currently thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have
statutes recognizing some form of a reporter’s privilege, and
almost half of them submitted an amicus curiae brief to the
Supreme Court of the United States in a recent reporter’s privilege case, arguing that the privilege serves the public’s interest.127
2. Purpose of the Privilege
The goal of the reporter’s privilege, like the attorney/client
and doctor/patient privileges, is to increase the flow of information in circumstances in which society wishes to encourage
open communication. The reporter’s privilege seeks to protect
the flow of information into the public discourse. The reporter’s
of His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 61 (1950).
124. See supra note 4.
125. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 116, § 5426, at 718 n.31.
126. See Robert A. Leflar, The Criminal Procedure Reforms of 1936—
Twenty Years After, 11 ARK. L. REV. 117, 126 (1957).
127.
The States care about this case . . . because they care about the reporter’s privilege. They recognize that the free flow of information is
vital to the workings of a healthy democracy; that journalists play a
crucial role in gathering and reporting such information; that the
most important information must often come from sources who need
or prefer to remain confidential; and that without the confidentiality
guaranteed by the reporter’s privilege, the sources will remain silent
and their information secret.
Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, Drogin v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (Apr. 5,
2006) (No. 05-969), and Thomas v. Wen Ho Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (Apr. 5, 2006)
(No. 05-1114), denying cert. to Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (2005).
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privilege protects two different sets of information: (1) the identity of confidential sources and (2) newsgathering materials. Although the protection of both kinds of information is important,
the protection of confidential sources is at the center of the reporter’s privilege debate.
The public’s interest in protecting the identity of confidential sources is essential to preserve the dissemination of information to the public. Because many people who provide information to the press would face serious personal, professional,
and possibly legal consequences if their identities were discovered, a privilege protecting their identities is vital for maintaining the flow of information to the press (and in turn to the public).128
Some scholars have noted that confidential sourcing is an
essential component in journalists’ ability to obtain information
from the government.129 As Justice Douglas warned in his dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, without a reporter’s privilege, “the
reporter’s main function in American society will be to pass on
to the public the press releases which the various departments
of government issue.”130 Indeed, even the Justice Department’s
internal guidelines on subpoenaing the press recognize that
forcing reporters to reveal their sources can “impair the news
gathering function.”131
The most famous whistleblower and secret source in
American history, Deep Throat, is a classic example of a person
who would not have divulged confidences to a reporter without
a promise of anonymity.132 W. Mark Felt, a former top FBI official, helped Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl
Bernstein uncover the Watergate scandal that ultimately led to
128. In this way, the reporter’s privilege is closely analogous to the government informant’s privilege. See Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for
Journalists’ Sources: Theory and Statutory Protection, 51 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 n.18
(1986). Of course the reporter’s privilege promotes society’s interest in the free
flow of ideas, which is at the very least implicitly based in the First Amendment. See id. The government informant’s privilege has no such constitutional
pedigree. See id.
129. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential
Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 25–26
(1988).
130. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1922) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2006).
132. BOB WOODWARD, THE SECRET MAN: THE STORY OF WATERGATE’S
DEEP THROAT 39–40 (2005) (noting Felt’s insistence on confidentiality).
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the appointment of a special criminal prosecutor, an impeachment inquiry in the House of Representatives, President
Nixon’s resignation, and the imprisonment of many of his top
aides.133
Since September 11, 2001, government employees have
played an especially important role in revealing government
corruption, illegality, and incompetence. Thanks to anonymous
sources, the public has learned that the United States is holding detainees in “black sites” around the globe;134 that soldiers
and military contractors were abusing detainees held at Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq;135 that the Executive Branch has been
engaging in domestic wiretapping without the oversight of the
FISA court;136 that counterterrorism officials have been monitoring the international financial transactions of thousands of
U.S. nationals without judicial supervision;137 and that a former Army intelligence program code-named “Able Danger” had
identified Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers as potential al Qaeda terrorists prior to September 11, but that government lawyers prevented the operation from passing this information along to the FBI.138 Without information from
government and military officials, the government’s illegal be133. See David Von Drehle, FBI’s No. 2 Was ‘Deep Throat,’ WASH. POST,
June 1, 2005, at A1.
134. See Dana Priest, Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight: Joint
Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account for Bulk of Agency’s Post-9/11 Successes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at A1; Josh White, Prisoner Accounts Suggest Detention at Secret Facilities: Rights Group Draws Link to the CIA, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2005, at A11.
135. In late April 2004, CBS’s 60 Minutes II broadcasted photographs of
torture at Abu Ghraib and presented interviews with military officials on the
subject. See Abuse of Iraqi POWs by GIs Probed, CBS NEWS, April 28, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml.
Shortly
thereafter the New Yorker obtained a copy of a secret report by Major General
Antonio M. Taguba concluding that systematic and illegal torture was occurring at Abu Ghraib. See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW
YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, 43. In May 2004 the Wall Street Journal released a confidential report by the International Committee of the Red Cross
detailing abuse of Iraqi prisoners. See David S. Cloud et al., Red Cross Found
Widespread Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2004, at A1.
136. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
137. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to
Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1.
138. Philip Shenon, Officer Says Military Blocked Sharing of Files on Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at A12.
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havior and incompetence may have never come to light. Confidential sources have been instrumental in revealing corruption,
fraud, and waste in the private sector as well.139
Some have questioned whether the privilege actually
serves to increase the number of sources willing to speak to the
media, often pointing to the lack of empirical data demonstrating the link. This criticism is odd because it flies in the face of
common sense and is inconsistent with the Court’s approach to
other privileges. The Court has never required hard statistical
evidence to justify its recognition of other privileges, such as
the attorney/client and doctor/patient privileges. In fact, scholars and social science researchers have cast doubt on the suggestion that people would not be forthcoming with their doctors
and lawyers if these communications were not privileged.140
Although it is empirically difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether shield laws render sources more willing to
speak to journalists, human nature indicates that they do.141
139. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (denying a motion to
quash subpoenas to San Francisco Chronicle reporters who revealed the existence of a grand jury investigation into the use of steroids in baseball); Laura
R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal, and Civic
Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 576 (2005) (mentioning
the pivotal role confidential sources have played in revealing the Enron accounting fraud scandal and wrongdoing by tobacco companies and by fertility
clinics); John E. Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the
Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 57, 73–74 (1985) (discussing survey findings that reporters use confidential sources most often in government, crime, and political reporting, but also
for a wide-range of other issues, including stories on the Roman Catholic
Church, toxic waste disposal, and nursing home fraud).
140. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 617 & nn.72–73 (1980); Daniel W. Shuman &
Myron F. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 926 (1982) (noting that patients rely more strongly on a therapist’s ethics than on the existence of a
statutory privilege); Myron F. Weiner & Daniel W. Shuman, Privilege—A
Comparative Study, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 373, 373 (1984) (comparing states
with a therapist/patient privilege and those without one and concluding that
the existence of a privilege has little impact on patient’s willingness to seek
treatment).
141. See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
97, 104 (2002) (“Sources often seek confidentiality to escape harm, embarrassment, or legal entanglement.”); Monk, supra note 128, at 5.
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Many sources providing sensitive information to journalists
would not do so if they were not protected.142 It is easier to ask
reporters how often they rely on confidential sources than to
determine whether sources would come forward regardless of
the confidentiality promise. Some researchers have attempted
to generate empirical evidence on this point,143 and anecdotal
evidence abounds.144 Given the inherent difficulties of studying
the importance of a promise of confidentiality, requiring empirical proof of this common-sense notion would be akin to rejecting it outright. The plentiful testimony of journalists that
sources do indeed rely on the privilege should be more than sufficient proof of its need.145 In addition, the Court has frequently
relied on common-sense notions lacking empirical proof in concluding that other forms of government action would chill protected First Amendment activities.146
In recent years, the use of anonymous sources has come
under heavy fire due to high-profile incidents involving journalists at well-regarded publications who fabricated sources for
fictitious stories. Jayson Blair at the New York Times, Stephen
Glass at the New Republic, Patricia Smith and Michael Barnicle from the Boston Globe, Jack Kelley from USA Today, and
Janet Cooke of the Washington Post are some of the more
prominent journalists giving the profession a bad name. But of
course these few examples represent a very small percentage of
all journalistic activity.

142. See, e.g., Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study,
70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 247, 284 (1971) (finding that newspaper reporters rely
on regular confidential sources 22.2% of the time); Eric Black, Making the
Case for a Federal Shield Law to Protect Journalists, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Oct. 26, 2005, at A4; Editorial, Protecting the Public’s Need to Know,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 12, 2006, at 8; Editorial, Reporters and
Sources: Congress Considers a Federal Shield Law, WASH. POST, June 15,
2006, at A26.
143. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 142.
144. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, Dedication, in ALL THE
PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974) (“To the President’s other men and women—in the
White House and elsewhere—who took risks to provide us with confidential
information. Without them there would have been no Watergate story told by
the Washington Post.”).
145. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 139, at 75 (noting that over seventy percent of journalists said that they could not do their jobs as effectively if the reporter’s privilege ceased to exist).
146. Donna M. Murasky, The Journalist’s Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 853–54 (1974).
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A weightier concern is that such sourcing will lead to “lazy
journalism”—journalists who do not make the extra effort for
an additional on-the-record source—and will undermine the
credibility of reporting because readers will be unable to evaluate the motives and knowledge of the sources.147 Indeed, major
media entities such as the New York Times and the Washington
Post have revised their editorial policies so that reliance on
anonymous sourcing is strongly discouraged and is the exception rather than the rule.148
Others have contended that reporters are too willing to
promise confidentiality. Norman Pearlstine, the editor-in-chief
of Time, Inc., said that Time’s Matthew Cooper (who ultimately
complied with a grand jury subpoena in the Valerie Plame leak
investigation) should not have promised confidentiality to Karl
Rove.149 Pearlstein stated that “[a] 90-second conversation with
the president’s spin doctor, who was trying to undermine a
whistle-blower, probably didn’t deserve confidential source
status.”150 Floyd Abrams, a prominent First Amendment lawyer who represented Judith Miller, recently noted that journalists frequently promise confidentiality before they even know

147. See Monk, supra note 128, at 7–8. According to a June 2005 Washington Post-ABC News poll, nearly two out of three individuals polled stated that
reporters use unnamed sources either the right amount or not often enough.
Richard Morin, Anonymous Approval, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at B5. The
First Amendment Center conducted a national survey in October 2004 and
found that seventy-two percent of those surveyed agreed with the statement
that “journalists should be allowed to keep a news source confidential.” Press
Release, First Amendment Ctr., 2004 Confidential-Source Survey, http://www
.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=2004_confidential_sources (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006). Fifty-two percent also agreed, however, that “news stories that rely on unnamed sources should not be published in the first place.”
Id.
148. The New York Times’ most recent policy statement on the use of
anonymous sources is posted online. New York Times Company, Confidential
News Sources (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.nytco.com/company-properties
-times-sources.html. The newspaper’s public editor wrote several articles criticizing the use of anonymous sources. See, e.g., Daniel Okrent, An Electrician
from the Ukrainian Town of Lutsk, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4, at 2 (urging
the paper to “turn the use of unidentified sources into an exceptional event”);
Daniel Okrent, Weapons of Mass Destruction? Or Mass Distraction?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2004, § 4, at 2 (expressing concern that at times a promise of
confidentiality is a license to lie).
149. David Caruso, Time Editor Says Rove Tip Wasn’t Worth Confidentiality Pledge, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 17, 2005, at A2.
150. Id.
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what the source is going to say, and that “the information, very
often . . . is not worth anything.”151 But eliminating the reporter’s privilege would not necessarily cure sloppy journalism,
and would instead punish careful journalists as well.152
Another oft-voiced objection to the privilege is that it obstructs the way to the truth and undermines law enforcement
efforts and criminal prosecutions. As University of Chicago
Law School Professor Geoffrey Stone recently argued before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the focus should instead be on all
of the criminal investigations that would never have begun absent a news article that relied on confidential sources. Professor
Stone persuasively argued that in evaluating the costs of the
privilege, one should focus on the moment the source speaks to
the journalist, not on the time the privilege is invoked.153 Like
the attorney/client privilege, the reporter’s privilege actually
generates more, not less, information.154 As one commentator
said with respect to the attorney/client privilege, “[b]ecause the
same information might not exist were it not for the privilege,
any loss of information when the privilege is upheld may be
more imagined than real.”155 As a result, it is easy to see how
the total cost of a reporter’s privilege would be significantly less
than other privileges courts readily recognize. Studies comparing criminal prosecutions in states that recognize a strong reporter’s privilege with states that do not have failed to demonstrate a noticeable difference in the effectiveness of law
enforcement.156 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, some states

151. Id.
152. See Handman, supra note 139, at 579; Monk, supra note 128, at 8–9.
153. Reporters’ Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) [hereinafter Professor
Stone’s Testimony before the S. Judiciary Comm.] (testimony of Geoffrey
Stone, Professor, University of Chicago Law School); see also Bob Dole, The
Underprivileged Press, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A15 (noting that the argument that the privilege would make it harder to prosecute crimes “ignores
the dozens of whistle-blowers who would not share information about government wrongdoing with the press unless they felt reporters could protect their
identities”).
154. Saltzburg, supra note 140, at 610 (noting that those who argue that
the attorney/client privilege results in a loss of information to the court “misconstrue[ ] a key point about the privilege—the privilege is intended to generate information”).
155. Id.
156. Professor Stone’s Testimony before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note
153, at 6; see also James A. Guest & Alan L. Stanzler, The Constitutional Ar-
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passed shield laws for the very purpose of increasing their ability to fight crime.157 In addition, there is no indication that the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Guidelines discouraging
subpoenas to journalists158 have harmed DOJ’s law enforcement efforts,159 even though in the past fifteen years DOJ has
approved only thirteen requests for media subpoenas.160
In the context of the debate concerning a proposed federal
shield law pending before Congress, some have expressed concern that the law could undermine national security. Porter
Goss made this argument in a February 2006 op-ed piece in the
New York Times.161 To support his point, Goss pointed to a leak
revealing that the CIA was tapping Osama bin Laden’s satellite
phone; soon after this information was published, the phone
went dead. (Blaming the American press for this intelligence
loss is questionable. Osama bin Laden had stopped using his
satellite phone before any U.S. publication mentioned the surveillance.162) Goss also noted that officials in other countries
have questioned whether they can trust the United States,
given the apparent inability of its citizens to keep a secret.163
Unfortunately, however, leaks have become an important
part of how this country learns about what its elected leaders
are doing in the name of “national security.” The Congressional
Research Service released a report in December 2005 demonstrating that one reason federal employees leak information to

gument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 18, 38 &
n.105 (1969) (noting that attorneys general and police chiefs from states with
shield laws largely believe that the laws have not interfered with law enforcement or undermined criminal prosecutions).
157. See Leflar, supra note 126, at 126.
158. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2006) (barring subpoenas to journalists unless information is “essential” and officials have balanced “the public’s interest in the
free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice”).
159. Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing on S. 2831 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Partner, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP).
160. Id. (statement of Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Virginia).
161. Porter Goss, Op-Ed., Loose Lips Sink Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006,
at A25.
162. Glenn Kessler, File the Bin Laden Phone Leak Under ‘Urban Myths,’
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at A2.
163. Goss, supra note 161.
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the press is that the government has failed to provide adequate
protection for whistleblowers.164 Although federal employees
are encouraged to report their concerns to officials in their
chain of command, the Inspector General’s Office, or the relevant Congressional oversight committee, in practice the current
environment does not invite whistleblowing.165 In fact, it may
actually discourage it. Congress has failed to provide adequate
and effective protection for whistleblowers, who suffer a grave
risk of retaliation if they come forward.166 The problem is exacerbated for whistleblowers in the intelligence community. The
existing and proposed whistleblower statutes explicitly deny
protection to these individuals, and they suffer the additional
risk of being stripped of their security clearances, a decision
that is generally not subject to independent judicial review.167
The reporter’s privilege also often protects the materials
collected in the course of newsgathering, such as notes, tapes,
outlines, photographs, and videos. This prong of the privilege
frequently shields such materials regardless of whether the
subject of these materials was published. The justification for
protecting newsgathering materials from disclosure is conceptually different from the rationale for the protection of confidential sources.168 Although in this context the privilege also
serves to protect the flow of information to the public, the primary justifications for protecting nonconfidential information
are to safeguard journalistic autonomy and independence and
to limit unnecessary burdens on the limited time and resources
of the press.169 One author aptly compared this prong of the re-

164. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL SECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS 12–16 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

RL33215.pdf.
165. See, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time
of Terror: The Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11
COMM. L. & POL’Y 479, 479–81 (2006).
166. See National Security Whistleblowers: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Beth Daley, Senior Investigator,
Project on Gov’t Oversight).
167. See id. (statement of Mark S. Zaid, Managing Partner, Krieger & Zaid,
PLLC (citing Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (holding that the
predicative judgment involved in determining security clearance determinations were best left to the Executive))).
168. See Jaynie Randall, Comment, Freeing Newsgathering from the Reporter’s Privilege, 114 YALE L.J. 1827, 1831–32 (2005).
169. Id.
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porter’s privilege to the attorney work-product privilege.170 Just
as the work-product privilege allows attorneys to develop litigation strategies and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases without fear that their work would be disclosed to
their adversaries, a privilege for newsgathering materials helps
protect editorial discretion and allows reporters to conduct investigations without fearing governmental intrusion.171
One of the most important consequences of the reporter’s
privilege is that it causes lawyers to think twice before subpoenaing journalists. Given the broad definition of “relevance” for
discoverable information, a journalist’s testimony could be
sought in almost every case. In many of the cases in which a
party seeks confidential sources or newsgathering materials
from a journalist, the requesting party has not sufficiently
sought the same information from other non-press sources, or
the requested information is not essential for the underlying
case.172 Recognizing a reporter’s privilege helps curb discovery
abuses, especially when that discovery would be a tremendous
burden on a journalist. Rather than having to testify only in
the rare case where the necessity for their testimony is demonstrated, reporters would be forced to spend hours testifying in
depositions and at trials. Without a privilege, lawyers will have
no reason to treat the discovery they can obtain from journalists any differently from discovery from any other non-party

170. Id. at 1830–31.
171. Id. at 1831.
172. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.
1986) (stating that the district court concluded the defamation plaintiff had
not exhausted other reasonable alternative means of obtaining information);
Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180–81 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
In Condit, the Eastern District of California rejected a motion to compel disclosure of the name of a reporter’s DOJ source when the plaintiff had not
taken a single deposition of DOJ officials. 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1180–81. The
court noted that “[p]laintiff is not required to depose everyone in the Justice
department to locate the source, but plaintiff must make some reasonable attempt to exhaust that alternative source.” Id.; see also Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144–46 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that the defamation plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that compelling testimony from the reporter was necessary for her case or that she had exhausted
other available resources); Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 1099, 1111 (D.D.C. 1991) (rejecting a motion to compel disclosure of
the identity of a source because the testimony of the source was not relevant to
trial); United States v. Vastola, 685 F. Supp. 917, 925 (D.N.J. 1988) (concluding that compelling testimony from reporters would not help the defendant).
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person or entity.173 In those cases where subpoenaing the media is appropriate, the reporter’s privilege encourages subpoenaing parties to negotiate with the media to modify the scope of
the subpoena. To the extent the government is concerned about
cracking down on leaks of confidential or even classified information, existing laws permit prosecutors to go after the leakers
themselves.174
B. STATE SHIELD LAWS
Currently thirty-two states and the District of Columbia
have statutory shield laws.175 A number of state courts have
also recognized a privilege based on their state constitutions,

173. Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 140, at 618–19 n.74 (making this same argument with respect to the doctor/patient privilege). Saltzburg notes that the
very existence of a privilege—even one riddled with exceptions—has a deterrent effect on discovery. Id.
174. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 2–13 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33502.pdf (summarizing existing statutes and regulations
prohibiting the disclosure of classified information).
175. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.310
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a)
(West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2005); Act of June 6, 2006, No. 06140, 2006 Conn. Pub. Acts 140 (effective Oct. 1, 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4320–26 (1999); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015
(2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901 to
-909 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 1998); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451
to :1459 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (2006); MINN. STAT. § 595.021–.024 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902 to -903 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (West 2003), invalidated by Ammerman v.
Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (N.M. 1976); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2005); N.D CENT. CODE
§ 31-01-06.2 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.11–.12 (LexisNexis 2000);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.520–.530
(2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.11 to -3 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1208 (2000). The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the state shield law was
unconstitutional because only the court, and not the legislature, has the authority to pass laws regarding the rules of evidence and procedure. Ammerman, 551 P.2d at 1359. In response, the New Mexico court promulgated an
evidentiary rule for journalists. See N.M. R. EVID. ANN. 11-514 (West 2006).
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common law, or the First Amendment.176 The scope of protection varies dramatically from state to state.
1. Proceedings Where the Privilege Attaches
Several states recognize an absolute privilege for a reporter’s sources and newsgathering materials in all proceedings, whether in a civil or criminal case or before an administrative agency or grand jury.177 More commonly, state
176. Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095, 1097
(Conn. 1976) (recognizing a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment); In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 43–46 (Idaho 1985) (recognizing
a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment, the Idaho Constitution,
and state common law); Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll.,
646 N.W.2d 97, 101–02 (Iowa 2002) (recognizing a privilege based on federal
and state constitutions); State v. Sandstrom (In re Pennington), 581 P.2d 812,
814 (Kan. 1978) (recognizing a qualified reporter’s privilege); In re Letellier,
578 A.2d 722, 726–27 (Me. 1990) (recognizing a qualified privilege based on
federal and state constitutions); In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 475 (Mass. 1980)
(stating that judges managing discovery must consider the First Amendment
implications of motion to compel); In re Photo Mktg. Assoc. Int’l, 327 N.W.2d
515, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing a qualified privileged under the
First Amendment); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982) (recognizing a qualified privilege under the First Amendment and the New Hampshire
Constitution); O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 277–78 (N.Y.
1988) (recognizing a privilege for nonconfidential materials under the New
York Constitution); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286–87 (Wis. 1978)
(recognizing a privilege under the Wisconsin Constitution).
177. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (stating that a reporter has an absolute
privilege as long as the information from the source has been published,
broadcast, or televised); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (recognizing an absolute privilege against being compelled to testify “before any jury, inquisitorial
body or commission, or before a committee of the legislature, or elsewhere”
about any information “procured or obtained by him for publication”); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (providing a privilege against being held in contempt “by
a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power
to issue subpoenas” for refusing to disclose a source or unpublished information); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4702(1), -4703(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-2 (providing an absolute protection for the identity of a source); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (recognizing an absolute protection for the identity of a source);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (providing for an absolute privilege for a source’s
identity or information obtained in the course of gathering, receiving, or processing news); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (providing an absolute protection for a source’s identity and for all unpublished information); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (providing an absolute protection for a source’s identity and all
unpublished information); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1) (creating an absolute
privilege in all proceedings for the source of published or unpublished information and for any unpublished information, except when a person claiming
privilege is believed to have committed or is about to commit a crime); 42 PA.
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privileges are qualified, forcing the reporter’s privilege to give
way when the party seeking the information has demonstrated
that (1) the desired information is important to the suit; (2)
that other means of obtaining the information have proven inadequate; and (3) the balance of interests favors disclosure.178
Other state statutes recognize the privilege in only certain
proceedings. In California, for instance, the shield law is most
effective in civil lawsuits in which the media is not a party; in
such suits, the private interests at stake are generally deemed
insufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in confidential

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942. But see Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 993 P.2d
50, 59 (Nev. 2000) (“[A]lthough the [Nevada] news shield statute provides an
absolute privilege to reporters engaged in the newsgathering process, there
may be certain situations, e.g., when a defendant’s countervailing constitutional rights are at issue, in which the news shield statute might have to yield
so that justice may be served.”).
178. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(3) (setting out a three-part test);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (same); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-906 to -907
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1459 (requiring an inquiry in cases seeking
unpublished information); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(d)(1)
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (providing for a qualified privilege before
a grand jury when an inquiry is for a crime punishable by life in prison);
MINN. STAT. § 595.024 (setting forth conditions necessary for overriding the
privilege); In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d at 44–45 (recognizing a qualified
privilege under the First Amendment, the Idaho Constitution, and common
law, and applying a balancing test); Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 308–
09 (Iowa 1982) (recognizing a qualified privilege subject to a three-factor inquiry); Sandstrom, 581 P.2d at 814 (recognizing a qualified privilege); State ex
rel. Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing a qualified privilege under the First Amendment); cf. In re Letellier, 578
A.2d at 726–27 (holding that a case-by-case balancing test, rather than a
three-factor test, applied); Siel, 444 A.2d at 503 (recognizing a three-part test
for overcoming a qualified privilege). Other state statutes provide more simply
that the privilege applies unless non-disclosure “will cause a miscarriage of
justice” or will be “contrary to the public interest.” See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.25.310(b) (providing that a court may deny a privilege if withholding testimony would “result in a miscarriage of justice or the denial of a fair trial to
those who challenge the privilege” or “be contrary to the public interest”); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1453 (requiring a finding that “disclosure is essential to
the public interest”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2. One state statute provides that the privilege applies in all proceedings unless it can be shown that
the publication was made “in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interest of
the public welfare.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005). Although the statute
specifically mentions only grand juries, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has
construed the statutory language “to any other authority” to include civil proceedings as well. See Saxton v. Ark. Gazette Co., 569 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Ark.
1978).
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sources.179 The privilege is often overcome in criminal matters,
however, especially when the defendant has issued the subpoena.180 In such cases, courts frequently conclude that the defendant’s interest in a fair trial often outweighs the reporter’s
interest in confidentiality.181
Some states explicitly reject the privilege when a media entity is a party to the litigation, a situation that typically occurs
in defamation cases.182 Other states provide the media with
some protection by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
information is important for her case and that she has attempted to obtain the information through other means.183
Some states have imposed additional requirements, such as requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate the “probable falsity” of the
challenged statements184 or to present a “prima facie case” of
defamation.185

179. See N.Y. Times v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 816 (Cal. 1990).
180. See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 945–51 (Cal. 1990)
(balancing the defendant’s need for the information against alternative
sources for that information).
181. See State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998) (noting that a court
must take into account a defendant’s due process rights). The California Supreme Court has noted that there are no conflicting rights when the prosecution seeks the information. See Miller v. Superior Court, 986 P.2d 170, 179
(Cal. 1999).
182. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995) (barring assertion of the
privilege by a party to the litigation); Downing v. Monitor Publ’g Co., 415 A.2d
683, 685–86 (N.H. 1980) (rejecting the privilege in a libel case in which the
media was a party).
183. See, e.g., Prentice v. McPhilemy, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2377, 2383
(D.C. Sup. Ct. 1999) (determining that the District of Columbia’s shield law
protections apply equally in defamation actions: the identity of sources receives absolute protection, while a qualified privilege applies to other unpublished information); In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d at 44 (explaining that
refusing to honor the privilege in libel cases “could be viewed not as exceptions
to a general rule of privilege, but as circumstances in which the balancing favors disclosure, since the source or information at issue may be so relevant
and material as to be at the very heart of the claim”).
184. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-904 (West 2003) (requiring plaintiffs in defamation actions to make “a prima facie showing of falsity of the alleged defamation and actual harm or injury due to the alleged defamation”);
Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Colo. 2000) (interpreting the Colorado
shield law to require a trial court to make a “preliminary determination of
whether the plaintiff has made a satisfactory showing of probable falsity”).
185. See Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W. 2d 650, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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2. Covered Information
There is also some disagreement among the states regarding whether shield laws should protect the identity of both nonconfidential sources and confidential sources; whether the
privilege should extend to newsgathering materials; and
whether publication is required before the protection can be invoked. In addition, some states exclude from protection eyewitness observations of criminal or tortious conduct.186
While some states protect only the identity of confidential
sources,187 other states protect both confidential and nonconfidential sources,188 although states in the latter category frequently give less protection to nonconfidential sources.189 The
majority of states with shield laws also extend the privilege to
newsgathering material, such as unpublished notes, tapes, and
any other data.190 The rationale for a broader privilege is the
186. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2)(d) (2005) (creating an exception to the privilege for “[n]ews information based on a newsperson’s personal
observation of the commission of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 4320(7) (1999) (creating an exception to the shield law in “any situation
in which the reporter is an eyewitness to or participant in an act involving
physical violence or property damage”); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (2005) (stating
that privilege applies “only to information or eyewitness observations obtained
within the normal scope of employment [of a professional journalist] and does
not apply to physical evidence, eyewitness observations, or visual or audio recording of crimes”); Pankratz v Dist. Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Colo. 1980)
(en banc) (holding that the Colorado privilege did not protect a reporter who
was a “first-hand observer of criminal conduct”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Ridenhour), 520 So. 2d 372, 376 (La. 1988) (suggesting that the state shield
law does not apply when “a reporter has witnessed criminal activity or has
physical evidence of a crime”).
187. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.25.300 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 3446-4-2 (LexisNexis 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005).
The Alabama, Arkansas, and Kentucky statutes apply only if the information
provided by the confidential sources has been published.
188. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-112(c) (LexisNexis 2002).
189. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 79-h(b), (c) (McKinney 1992) (giving
absolute protection to the identity of confidential sources but only qualified
protection for sources who did not give information in confidence).
190. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-119(1)(b) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(2) (1999); D.C. CODE
§ 16-4702; FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2) (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(1)
(West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1)
(2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-146(1) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2005);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (West
2003); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(b) (2005);
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concern that the otherwise “autonomous press” would become
an investigative arm for the government and private litigants.191 One court has noted that journalists frequently gather
information about accidents and crimes; as a result, discovery
requests to journalists could easily impose a heavy burden on
their time and resources and disrupt their newsgathering activities.192 Some states limit this protection to unpublished information,193 reasoning that requiring reporters to testify about
published information, which typically requires them only to
authenticate the publications, “should have no ‘chilling effect’
on the free flow of information.”194 Other states draw a distinction between information received in confidence and nonconfidential information, on the grounds that requiring a journalist
to reveal confidential information is more likely to curtail her
ability to conduct newsgathering in the future.195
The privilege appears to be the weakest when a journalist
witnesses criminal or tortious activity without any pre-existing
promise of confidentiality, such as when she is on the scene of a
car accident or an illegal arrest.196 Several state statutes explicitly carve out an exception to the privilege under such circumstances;197 in other states, the matter is handled on a case-bycase basis, with the probative and irreplaceable value of the reporter’s testimony weighing in favor of disclosure.198 In a similar vein, Oregon’s statute makes clear that its otherwise absoN.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(B)
(West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2
(1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2000); see also CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 2(b); N.M. R. EVID. 514(b).
191. O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. 1988).
192. See id.
193. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90-119(2)(b), 24-72.5-103(1)(b) (2005);
D.C. CODE § 16-4702(2) (2001); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9112(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-146(2) (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7(A)(2) (West 2003); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(B)(2) (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1)(b) (2005);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(a) (1997).
194. In re Morris Commc’ns Co., 573 S.E.2d 420, 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
195. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 949 (Cal. 1990).
196. Handman, supra note 139, at 582–83.
197. See supra note 186.
198. See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 952–53 (requiring reporters who had accompanied a police patrol to give eyewitness testimony of a search and seizure the
police conducted in the reporters’ presence); Bartlett v. Superior Court, 722
P.2d 346, 351–52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the necessary showing
had been made to require a reporter to produce a videotape of a car accident).
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lute shield law does not apply when there is “probable cause” to
believe that the person asserting the privilege “has committed,
is committing or is about to commit a crime.”199
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first case to suggest that the First Amendment provides reporters with protection from subpoenas was the Second
Circuit’s decision in Garland v. Torre, in which the actress
Judy Garland sued CBS for defamation.200 Garland had subpoenaed a reporter who had quoted an unnamed CBS executive
as saying that Garland was depressed because she was getting
fat.201 The court stated that it would “accept at the outset the
hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of
press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news.”202 The Second Circuit went on to add, however,
that “freedom of the press, precious and vital though it is to a
free society, is not an absolute.”203 The court ultimately concluded that the “obligation of a witness to testify and the correlative right of a litigant to enlist judicial compulsion of testimony” outweighed any First Amendment interest in
confidentiality because the questioning “went to the heart of
the plaintiff ’s claim.”204
The Supreme Court did not address the viability of a First
Amendment reporter’s privilege until 1972, in a case that
raised more questions than it answered. In Branzburg v. Hayes,
the Court decided four separate cases that involved reporters’
invocation of the privilege before state or federal grand juries.205 Two of these cases involved Paul Branzburg, a reporter
for a daily newspaper in Kentucky.206 He had written articles
about the sale and use of drugs, which he had observed firsthand after promising not to reveal the identity of any of the individuals involved.207 The other two cases involved reporters

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(2) (2005).
259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958).
Id.; see also Bowden, supra note 114, at 28.
Garland, 259 F.2d at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549–50.
See 408 U.S. 665, 667–79 (1972).
See id. at 667–69.
Id.
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who had spent time with the Black Panthers; these reporters
were Paul Pappas, a television reporter subpoenaed by a Massachusetts grand jury, and New York Times reporter Earl
Caldwell, who was challenging a federal grand jury subpoena.208
Justice Bryon White’s 5-4 majority opinion in Branzburg
appeared to sound the death knell for a constitutional reporter’s privilege, at least in the context of grand jury subpoenas. Throughout the majority opinion, Justice White emphasized the important role the grand jury plays in the American
criminal system,209 explaining that the public’s interest in
prosecuting crime outweighed reporters’ concerns that testifying would harm their relationships with confidential sources
and their ability to collect information.210 In addition, the Court
noted that the majority of States had not enacted shield laws—
only seventeen had at that time—and that Congress on several
occasions had failed to pass proposed federal shield statutes.211
The Branzburg Court also took great pains to question the
need for a reporter’s privilege, emphasizing the lack of—and
the impossibility of ever obtaining—empirical data showing
that sources would not speak to reporters without a privilege,
or that the free flow of information to the public would be affected in any significant way.212 The Court noted that the relationship between reporters and their sources is frequently
“symbiotic,” in that “often . . . informants are members of a minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propagate their views, publicize their aims, and magnify
208. See id. at 672–79.
209. See id. at 695.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 689 n.28. In 2005 and 2006, Congress considered, but failed to
pass, two proposed federal shield law statutes. The Free Flow of Information
Act of 2006, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006); See The Free Flow of Information Act
of 2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005).
212. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693–94 (“Estimates of the inhibiting effect
of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures to
newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative.”). In 2005,
the District Court for the District of Columbia echoed this concern in a case
rejecting a federal common law privilege. See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.
Supp. 2d 123, 141 (D.D.C. 2005) (explaining that“[t]he right to keep confidential an anonymous source is not ‘transcendent’ in the same sense” as other
privileges recognized at common law, such as the attorney/client privilege and
the doctor/patient privilege, because “[a]nonymous sources are not a sine qua
non of journalism but only an important and useful tool”).
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their exposure to the public.”213 Justice White also questioned
how valuable a qualified privilege would be. Given the ad hoc
approach that a qualified privilege requires, the Court was
skeptical that an uncertain privilege could be meaningful for
“sensitive” sources.214
When the Branzburg decision was first released, many
media lawyers justifiably regarded it as a catastrophic blow to
reporters.215 Until very recently, however, most lower courts
did not construe Branzburg as rejecting a constitutional reporter’s privilege. This response was based on several factors.
First, in Justice White’s majority opinion, the Court made clear
that the press “‘has no special immunity from the application of
general laws’”216 and no greater right of access to information
than the public,217 but then went on to say that “without some
[constitutional] protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated.”218 Given this statement, a few
courts claiming to reject a constitutional privilege have, at the
same time, emphasized that judges should review subpoenas to
the media with a “heightened sensitivity” to First Amendment
concerns and limit or refuse to enforce subpoenas that are not
directly relevant to a good faith claim or seek information obtainable from a less sensitive source.219
213. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694–95.
214. Id. at 702 (“If newsmen’s confidential sources are as sensitive as they
are claimed to be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem.”).
215. See, e.g., Marie Brenner, Lies and Consequences: Sixteen Words That
Changed the World, VANITY FAIR, April 2006, at 204, 258 (summarizing the
adverse reaction of former New York Times general counsel James Goodale);
Norman Issacs, Beyond the ‘Caldwell’ Decision: 1, COLUMB. JOURNALISM REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 1972, at 18, 20 (arguing that after Branzburg, “[t]he best hope for
new sources now appears to lie in the passage of federal and state ‘shield’
laws”); A.M. Rosenthal, The Press Needs a Slogan: “Save the First Amendment!,” N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 11, 1973, at 16, 49 (“[T]here is serious question
as to whether the press will be able to function as it has in the past, not simply
in the investigation of wrongdoing but in inquiry into Government process.”).
216. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)).
217. See id. at 684 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728–30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
218. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
219. See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Scarce v. United States (In
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Causing by far the most confusion, however, has been Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Branzburg. Although Justice
Powell cast the fifth vote in support of Justice White’s majority
opinion, his concurrence emphasized what he viewed as the
“limited nature” of the Court’s opinion.220 Justice Powell wrote
that “[t]he Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights
with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources,”221 and suggested that courts use a balancing test to
determine whether to recognize a privilege:
[T]he asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.222

Because Justice Powell cast the deciding vote in
Branzburg, many courts and commentators have read his concurring opinion as the controlling opinion in the case.223 The
re Grand Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
privilege in a grand jury context); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir.
1992); Storer Commc’ns Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810
F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1987); Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555
S.E.2d 175, 180 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“[A]lthough there is no federal or state
constitutional privilege, legislative act, or common law which protects against
the disclosure of confidential sources [in defamation cases], there is a strong
public policy in favor of allowing journalists to shield the identity of their confidential sources unless disclosure is necessary in order to meet other important purposes of the law.”); Marketos v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d
272, 280 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
220. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 710.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Model Magazine Distrib. Inc., (In re Grand
Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum), 955 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982); ROBERT D.
SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 14.3.2, at 14-13 to -14 (3d ed. 2001) (“Because
Justice White’s plurality opinion was rather enigmatic and Justice Powell’s
was the pivotal fifth vote, his concurring opinion has been treated as authoritative.”); 1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2, at 288 (5th ed.
1999) (stating that in Branzburg, the rejection of the First Amendment reporter’s privilege “did not command an absolute majority of the Court”); Potter
Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975) (“[In Branzburg],
the Court rejected the [reporters’] claims by a vote of five to four, or, considering Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, perhaps by a vote of four and a
half to four and a half.”). Indeed, some courts and commentators erroneously
interpreted Justice White’s opinion to be a plurality opinion. See, e.g., James
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four dissenting Justices in Branzburg would have held that a
privilege applied.224 Justice Douglas, standing alone, stated
that journalists were entitled to an absolute privilege.225 Justice Stewart, writing for himself and Justices Marshall and
Brennan, claimed that the reporters were entitled to a qualified
privilege that could be overcome only if the government meets
the following standard:
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of the law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in the information.226

Other courts have refused to construe Justice Powell’s concurring opinion as embracing a First Amendment privilege; instead, these courts explain, Justice Powell simply suggested
that the First Amendment provides protection when a subpoena has been issued in bad faith or for harassing purposes.227
In the last few years, the minority view that Powell’s concurring opinion is largely irrelevant has been gaining ground.228
C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 715 (1975); see also Smith, 135 F.3d at 968–
69; Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 938 n.3 (Cal. 1990); Conn. State
Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 370 A.2d, 1095, 1097 (Conn. 1976); State v.
Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208, 209 (Idaho 1995).
224. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 725
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
227. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that First Amendment concerns come into play only if a subpoena is intended to harass or to interfere with a reporter’s relationship with sources);
Smith, 135 F.3d at 969 (asserting that Justice Powell was concerned about
harassment of the press); Storer Commc’ns Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury
Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that recognizing a
privilege after Branzburg would be “tantamount to our substituting, as the
holding of Branzburg, the dissent . . . for the majority opinion”).
228. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 173–74 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Branzburg itself involved a grand jury subpoena, is concededly the governing
precedent, and none of the opinions of the Court, save that of Justice Douglas,
adopts a test that would afford protection against the present investigation.”);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“[W]hatever Justice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority.
Not only did he join the majority in name, but because of his joinder with the
rest of a majority, the Court reached a result that rejected First Amendment
privilege not to testify before the grand jury for reporters situated precisely
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Even if Branzburg is correctly read to reject a constitutional reporter’s privilege to refuse to testify before a grand
jury,229 it still remains unclear whether such a privilege exists
in criminal and civil proceedings. Some have argued that the
reasoning of Branzburg applies equally to criminal trials as to
grand juries because, as one court explained, “[s]urely the public has as great an interest in convicting its criminals as it does
in indicting them.”230 Other courts have read Branzburg as limited to grand jury proceedings and have held that a First
Amendment privilege applies in both civil and criminal proceedings.231 Noting that it would be inappropriate to assume
that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment and due process
rights always outweigh the First Amendment interests at
stake, these courts instead recognize a qualified privilege that
permits a defendant’s interests in a fair trial and due process to
be taken into account in the balance.232
like those in the present case.”); McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533 (“It seems to us
that rather than speaking of privilege, courts should simply make sure that a
subpoena duces tecum directed to the media, like any other subpoena duces
tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances, which is the general criterion for
judicial review of subpoenas.”). The First Circuit has been reluctant to recognize a “privilege” for reporters, but has recognized that a special “balancing
test” should be applied in press cases in light of First Amendment concerns.
See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1998).
229. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d at 1147–49 (holding that no First Amendment privilege exists in the grand jury context); Storer
Commc’ns Inc., 810 F.2d at 583–86 (noting that the majority in Branzburg rejected the existence of a First Amendment privilege before a grand jury);
Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he first amendment does not afford a reporter a privilege to refuse to testify before a federal
grand jury as to information received in confidence.”); Pankratz v. District
Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (“In determining that there
is no privilege under the First Amendment, we need only cite the language of
the United States Supreme Court in Branzburg . . . .”).
230. Smith, 135 F.3d at 971.
231. Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a
privilege in civil cases); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th
Cir. 1986) (recognizing a privilege in a criminal case); United States v. Burke,
700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a privilege in both criminal and
civil cases); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing a privilege in criminal cases); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d
708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing a privilege in civil cases); Baker v. F&F
Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972) (recognizing a privilege in a civil case).
232. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147; Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468–69
(9th Cir. 1975) (holding that a defendant’s right to a fair trial outweighed a
reporter’s First Amendment privilege to withhold disclosure of the names of
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Many courts have expressly held that a First Amendment
privilege exists in civil cases.233 In civil cases, the interests favoring disclosure are often much less weighty, particularly
when the press is not a party to the litigation.234 The courts
disagree, however, whether nonconfidential materials should
be given the same protection.235 Although some courts extend
the protection to nonconfidential material on the grounds that
the disclosure of such materials constitutes a worrisome intrusion into the newsgathering and editing process, most recognize
that “the lack of a confidential source may be an important

sources who violated a court’s gag order).
233. Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 56–58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), and cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 2372 (2006), and cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006) (citing Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.
1981)); Smith, 135 F.3d at 968–72; Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (9th
Cir. 1993); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436–38 (10th Cir. 1977).
234. See, e.g., Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712 (“[I]n the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure should yield to the journalist’s privilege.”); Riley,
612 F.2d at 716 (“[A] case-by-case analysis is mandated even more in civil
cases than in criminal cases, for in the former the public’s interest in casting a
protective shroud over the newsmen’s sources and information warrants an
even greater weight than in the latter.” (quoting Altemose Constr. v. Bldg. &
Constr. Trade Council, 443 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. Penn. 1977) (internal quotations omitted))); Baker, 470 F.2d at 784–85 (noting that Branzburg, which
was concerned with the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, does not control
the outcome in criminal proceedings, much less civil proceedings, where the
public’s interest in disclosure is often less weighty); Rosato v. Superior Court,
124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 444 n.14 (Ct. App. 1975) (“[I]n a civil discovery proceeding
there is not a sufficient compelling state or public interest to outweigh the
conditional First Amendment right not to disclose sources.”).
235. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35–36 (2d Cir.
1999) (extending a privilege to nonconfidential materials); Shoen, 5 F.3d at
1295–96 (“[T]he journalist’s privilege applies to a journalist’s resource materials even in the absence of the element of confidentiality.”); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a journalist’s privilege regarding defamatory statements published about the Church of
Scientology); Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147 (holding that the First Amendment
protects newsgathering materials). But see McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530,
533 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the First Amendment privilege, if it exists
at all, does not cover nonconfidential information); United States v. Jennings,
No. 97 CR 765, 1999 WL 438984, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1999) (rejecting a
privilege for nonconfidential materials); Bartlett v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d
346, 350–51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (denying a motion to quash in a personal injury case and finding that a subpoena for nonconfidential materials does not
threaten relationships with sources or interfere with the newsgathering or editing process).
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element in balancing the defendant’s need for the material
sought against the interest of the journalist in preventing production in a particular case.”236
In addition, courts reviewing First Amendment privilege
claims have noted that in civil cases in which the reporter or
his employer are parties, the balance is more likely—but not
necessarily—going to tip in favor of disclosure so that the plaintiff can establish the relevant level of fault, whether negligence
or actual malice.237 When courts have recognized a First
Amendment privilege in defamation cases, they have recognized it as a qualified, not absolute, privilege, adopting Justice
Stewart’s three-part test in his Branzburg dissent.238
Courts are also hesitant to extend First Amendment protection to a journalist who has witnessed a crime. These courts
rest their analysis largely on the fact that Branzburg itself held
that reporter Paul Branzburg could not avoid a subpoena to
testify before the grand jury after he observed the making of
hashish.239
Although the Branzburg majority invited Congress “to
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned . . . as experience . . . may
dictate,”240 Congress has yet to take the Court up on this suggestion.241
236. Wolf v. United States, No. 06-16403, 2006 WL 2631398, at *2 & n.1
(9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2006) (mem.) (noting that even if a qualified privilege applied
in the grand jury context, the blogger world would be forced to comply with
subpoenas for videotape footage of public events); Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at
147; see also United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1180–82
(1st Cir. 1988).
237. See, e.g., Price v. Time, Inc. 416 F.3d 1327, 1343–48 (11th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the invocation of the privilege by a party to a defamation action); cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (holding that the First Amendment
does not bar discovery into the editorial process in defamation actions because
the plaintiff has the burden of proving fault).
238. See, e.g., LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139; In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,
621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980);
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 631–35 (Cal. 1984).
239. See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 550 F. Supp. 530, 532 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (relying
on Branzburg in a decision requiring a reporter to testify about an assault he
witnessed outside a courtroom); Ex parte Grothe, 687 S.W.2d 736, 738–39
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (relying on Branzburg in compelling a photographer to
produce photographs he took during a public protest).
240. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
241. The Senate Judiciary Committee last considered proposed federal
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D. FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Given the current tendency of courts to reject a First
Amendment privilege, courts have started to examine the possibility of a privilege based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
Rule 501 provides that judges can decide whether a witness is
entitled to a privilege under “the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.”242 In granting courts broad
latitude to recognize privileges, Congress rejected the original
proposal of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, recommending the adoption of nine enumerated privileges.243 Although the journalist’s privilege was not among the nine enumerated privileges, the open-ended Rule 501 that Congress
ultimately adopted allows courts to adopt such a privilege “in
light of reason and experience.”244 Indeed, the principal draftsman of Rule 501, Representative William Hungate, specifically
noted that the flexible language of Rule 501 “cannot be interpreted as a congressional expression in favor of having no such
privilege, nor can the conference action be interpreted as denying to newspeople any protection they may have from State
newsperson’s privilege laws.”245
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court stated that three
principles governed the recognition of privileges under Rule
shield law legislation in 2006. The Supreme Court has not heard any cases involving a First Amendment reporter’s privilege since Branzburg. It recently
denied petitions for certiorari in the Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper cases,
Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Cooper v. United States, 125 S.
Ct. 2977 (2005). In the Wen Ho Lee case, Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53
(D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006), and cert denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2372 (2006), and cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2373 (2006), the Supreme Court
denied the media’s petition for certiorari raising both the First Amendment
and federal common law reporter’s privilege issue after the parties settled.
Many have urged the Court to take a reporter’s privilege case again, especially
in light of the growing numbers of subpoenas to journalists in the last few
years. See, e.g., Nathan Siegel, Our History of Media Protection, WASH. POST,
Oct. 3, 2005, at A17.
242. FED. R. EVID. 501.
243. The nine enumerated privileges were (1) required reports; (2) attorney/client; (3) psychotherapist/patient; (4) husband/wife; (5) communications
to clergymen; (6) political vote; (7) trade secrets; (8) state secrets; and (9) confidential informants. See Michael H. Graham, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.1 (5th ed. 2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082).
244. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Graham, supra note 243, § 501.1.
245. 120 CONG. REC. 30, 40,891 (1974).

PAPANDREA_4FMT

560

2/16/2007 9:57:45 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:515

501: (1) the significant public and private interests that would
be served by any proposed privileges; (2) the balance of the public and private interest in the privilege against the burden on
truth-seeking that the privilege would impose; and (3) “reason
and experience” based on state recognition of the privilege.246
In Jaffee, the Court held that these three considerations
supported the recognition of a psychotherapist/patient privilege. The Court first noted that the public and private interest
in the mental health of citizens requires “[e]ffective psychotherapy,” which in turn “depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank
and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and
fears.”247 The Court held that the public interest in effective
mental health treatment outweighed the loss of probative evidence that recognition of the privilege might entail because
without the privilege, patients would be less likely to divulge
the very confidential information at issue.248 Finally, the Court
found it persuasive that all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized some form of the privilege.249
The relatively few courts to address whether Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 supports a reporter’s privilege have reached
mixed results. At least two courts that were asked to recognize
a privilege refused to do so because the material sought was not
confidential.250 Some courts have held that, at least with respect to grand jury proceedings, the Supreme Court already
conducted the relevant balancing inquiry in the Branzburg decision, where it concluded that the public’s right to evidence
outweighed the interest in continued confidentiality.251 The
246. 518 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1996).
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id. at 11–12.
249. Id. at 12–13.
250. United States v. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892–93 (E.D. Ark. 2002)
(refusing to recognize a federal common law privilege to protect a reporter
from a subpoena asking her to testify about the truth and accuracy of her articles when there was no claim that in so testifying she would be forced to reveal
confidential sources or documents); In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., No.
98 MISC. 8-85 (PKL), 1998 WL 883299, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1998) (refusing to recognize a federal common law privilege when a subpoena sought
nonconfidential information).
251. Scarce v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397,
402–03 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Branzburg indicated that common law
provided no privilege to journalists); In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338
F. Supp. 2d 16, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that federal common law did not
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District Court of the District of Columbia rejected the existence
of a federal common law privilege in a civil case as well.252
Other courts have held that the federal common law does
provide a privilege. The Third Circuit has recognized a federal
common law privilege in criminal and civil proceedings.253 Although the D.C. Circuit was asked in the Judith Miller litigation to recognize a common law privilege, the panel was unable
to reach a decision on whether to do so.254 The Second Circuit
also ducked the issue in Gonzales v. New York Times, holding
that even if such a privilege existed, it would be qualified, and
that the government had made a sufficient showing in the case
under review to overcome it.255
The application of the Jaffee factors appears to support the
existence of a federal common law reporter’s privilege. With respect to the first Jaffee prong, a privilege supports the press’s
truth-seeking function. Just as the lack of a privilege would
chill communications between psychologists and their patients
and prevent the information litigants seek from ever coming
into evidence, the lack of a journalist privilege will chill com-

provide a basis for quashing a subpoena to a journalist to testify before a
grand jury); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing to recognize a
federal common law privilege “unless and until the Supreme Court states that
a common law reporter’s privilege exists, or unless Congress enacts such a
privilege”). But see In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 367 (W.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that a qualified common law privilege applies in a grand jury setting),
aff ’d en banc, 963 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1992); In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373, 375–77 (Mass. 1991) (applying a qualified common
law privilege to quash a subpoena).
252. Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 137–42 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying both a First Amendment and a federal common law reporter’s privilege).
253. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146–47 (3d Cir. 1980)
(criminal proceedings); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 713–16 (3d Cir.
1979) (civil proceedings).
254. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 973 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (“The Court is not of one mind on the existence of a common law
privilege . . . . However, all believe that if there is any such privilege, it is not
absolute and may be overcome by an appropriate showing.”). The D.C. Circuit
dodged another opportunity to address this issue in the Wen Ho Lee litigation.
See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 57–64 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff ’g on other
grounds 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(2006), and cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 2372 (2006), and cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2373 (2006).
255. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).
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munications from sources.256 As one court explained, “[u]nless
potential sources are confident that compelled disclosure is
unlikely, they will be reluctant to disclose any confidential information to reporters,”257 and “‘the flow of information to the
public will be diminished regardless of whether disclosure could
have actually been compelled.’”258 In addition, reporters fearing
a subpoena may be reluctant to publish information obtained
from confidential sources.259
The second Jaffee prong is also satisfied because the evidentiary benefit that would be lost from the privilege is minimal when compared to the loss of information to the public.260
Journalists have relied on confidential sources to report not
only on government misconduct, but also on organized crime,
environmental and nuclear safety issues, and many other matters of indisputable public interest.261 Recognizing the federal
common law privilege as qualified, rather than absolute, helps
strike a proper balance between the competing public interests
in those cases where the need for the journalist’s testimony and
evidence is compelling.262
The third Jaffee consideration is easily met because thirtytwo states and the District of Columbia have statutory shield
laws and fourteen additional states have recognized a privilege
through judicial decision.263 Because most states recognize a
reporter’s privilege, failing to recognize a federal common law
privilege would in many cases “frustrate the purposes of the
state legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential
communications.”264
256. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d at 991 (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
257. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
258. Id. at 712–13 n.46 (quoting Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The
Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 336
(1970) (footnote omitted)).
259. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
rev’d on other grounds, 459 F.3d 160.
260. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d at 991 (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
261. N.Y. Times Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d at 498–99.
262. See id. at 501.
263. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
264. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (noting, with respect to the
psychotherapist/patient privilege, that “any State’s promise of confidentiality
would have little value if the patient were aware that the privilege would not
be honored in a federal court”).
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The courts holding that a federal common law privilege exists have held that it is a qualified privilege that can be overcome with a showing of materiality and exhaustion.265 Judge
Tatel’s concurring opinion in the Judith Miller case, in which
he reasoned that a qualified privilege existed under federal
common law, added a suggestion that in cases where the government is investigating a leak, the court must also conduct a
balancing test:
In leak cases . . . courts applying the privilege must consider [1] not
only the government’s need for the information and exhaustion of alternative sources, but also [2] the two competing public interests lying
at the heart of the balancing test. Specifically, the court must weigh
the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm
the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information’s value. That framework allows authorities seeking to punish a leak to access key evidence when the
leaked information does more harm than good . . . while preventing
discovery when no public interest supports it . . . .266

Judge Tatel argued that in leak cases a balancing test was
essential because the necessity and exhaustion requirements
would be easily met in every case.267 Thus, for example, Judge
Tatel argued in his dissent from the denial of the rehearing en
banc petition in Wen Ho Lee’s Privacy Act case that the court
should have balanced the plaintiff ’s interest in receiving compensation from the government for leaking personal information about him against the public’s interest in obtaining information about what was at the time believed to be nuclear
espionage.268 Some have criticized Judge Tatel’s proposed test
because it puts the courts in the awkward and difficult position

265. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716–17 (3d Cir. 1979);
N.Y. Times Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d at 501–02, 510.
266. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 997–98
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring). In a civil case, the balancing requirement would weigh a private litigant’s interest in compelling disclosure against
the public’s interest in newsgathering. See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F. Supp.
2d 123, 138 & n.20 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that Judge Tatel’s balancing test
would have to be altered if applied in civil cases where there is no identifiable
public interest in disclosure).
267. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d at 997 (Tatel, J.,
concurring); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(2006), and cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 2372 (2006), and cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2373 (2006).
268. Lee, 428 F.3d at 302.
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of determining what is sufficiently “newsworthy” to outweigh
the subpoenaing party’s interests.269
III. SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE AND
TO WHOM IT ATTACHES
Although many states have passed statutory shield laws,
no federal shield law exists. Very few state statutes limit the
shield based on the intent of individuals claiming protection.
Instead, statutes tend to focus on more objective factors and
limit their coverage to specific types of media entities or require
that individuals have regular work as journalists. Without
amendment, many of these statutes will not cover bloggers and
other citizen journalists who do not use television, radio, or
newspapers to disseminate their ideas and are not employed as
journalists for mainstream media companies.
A. STATE DEFINITIONS
Many state statutory shield laws list specific types of media in their provisions. Those passed in the 1930s initially included only newspapers and had to be amended to include
other forms of media, such as radio, television, and magazines.270 Those that have not been amended since the 1940s
still do not cover television.271 Several other states have similar
statutes that include only reporters who publish on television
or radio or in a newspaper.272 Very few statutes explicitly in269. See, e.g., Lee, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 139–40 (“Courts are ill-suited to decide the degree to which information is beneficial or unimportant to the common weal.”).
270. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 1998) (applying the
privilege to newspapers and “other periodical[s] issued at regular intervals
and having a regular circulation,” news wire services and press associations,
and licensed television and radio stations); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902
(2005) (applying the shield law to a “newspaper, magazine, press association,
news agency, news service, radio station, television station, or community antenna television service” and its employees).
271. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005) (covering newspaper and
radio but not television). The Arkansas statute has not been amended since
1949. See id. (indicating that the statute was last amended in 1949). But see
Williams v. Am. Broad. Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658, 665 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (stating in
dicta that the court did not “have any doubt” that the state shield law “would
be extended to television reporters”).
272. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 1975) (providing an absolute privilege for individuals “engaged in, connected with or employed on any
newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station, while engaged in a
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clude electronic news media.273 More modern statutes cover a
broader range of media, although it is not clear whether many
of these statutes would cover publications that appear solely on
the Internet.274
Courts have strictly construed statutory restrictions on
what types of media are entitled to invoke the privilege. In
2005, the Eleventh Circuit confronted this issue in Price v.
Time, Inc.,275 holding that Alabama’s shield statute did not
news-gathering capacity”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005)
(applying the privilege to those “engaged or employed” by newspaper, radio, or
television stations).
273. New Jersey’s shield law is one of the rare exceptions. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21a (West 1994) (defining “[n]ews media” entitled to invoke the
privilege as “newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies, wire
services, radio, television or other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or
electronic means of disseminating news to the general public”); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(3) (2005) (defining “[n]ews medium” as “[a]ny entity
regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of news via
print, broadcast, or other electronic means accessible to the general public”).
274. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(1)(a) (2005) (applying the statute to
“mass medium,” defined as “any publisher of a newspaper or periodical; wire
service; radio or television station or network; news or feature syndicate; or
cable television system”); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995) (allowing the privilege to be invoked by “[a]ny person, company, or other entity engaged in the
gathering and dissemination of news for the public through a newspaper,
book, magazine, or radio or television broadcast”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:1451 (1995) (defining “news media” to include “newspaper[s] or other periodical[s] issued at regular intervals and having a paid general circulation,”
as well as television, radio, press associations, and wire services). But see D.C.
CODE § 16-4701 (2001) (defining “news media” to include “[a]ny printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the public”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (2005) (applying the
privilege to “any newspaper, magazine, press association, news agency, news
service, radio station, television station, or community antenna television service”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7(B)(2) (West 2003) (defining the phrase “medium of communication” as “any newspaper, magazine, press association,
news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast or television
station or network, or cable television system”); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-53.11(a)(3) (defining “[n]ews medium” broadly).
275. 416 F.3d 1327, 1346 (11th Cir.), as modified on denial of reh’g, 425
F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2005). In Price, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had to make “reasonable” efforts to determine the identity of Sports Illustrated’s confidential source. Id. The circuit court originally ordered the counsel
for Sports Illustrated to inform the district court if one of the four women deposed lied about being the source for an allegedly defamatory article in the
magazine, id. at 1347, but the court later amended its opinion to hold that
Sport Illustrated’s counsel had no obligation to report perjury to the court as
long as his client ultimately revealed the identity of its source or sources.
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cover a reporter from Sports Illustrated because the statute
was limited to persons “engaged in, connected with, or employed on any newspaper, radio broadcasting station or television station . . . .”276 This case suggests that “citizen journalists”
seeking protection under a state shield law listing specific covered media have little hope of success, given the tendency of
state courts to interpret shield law statutes strictly.277
Some state shield laws apply only to individuals employed
by an established media entity;278 some specifically require
“regular” or “frequent” employment. For example, the Arizona
shield law applies to “[a] person engaged in newspaper, radio,
television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by
a newspaper, radio or television station,”279 and courts have
limited its application to those “engaged in the gathering and
dissemination of news to the public on a regular basis.”280
Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Oklahoma similarly
require journalists to be “regularly engaged” in the business or
activities of journalism.281 Given that citizen journalists are not

Price, 425 F.3d at 1294.
276. Price, 416 F.3d at 1335, 1341.
277. Id. at 1337–38; see also Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465, 472
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding that California privilege law, which on its face applied only to “newspapers,” did not apply to other periodicals); Deltec, Inc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788, 789–90 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (rejecting
the attempts of a bi-monthly publication to invoke statutory privilege applicable only to “newspapers and press associations”).
278. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995) (applying privilege to those “connected with or employed” by a “newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service,” or by a radio or television
station).
279. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003).
280. Matera v. Superior Court, 825 P.2d 971, 973–75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(construing the shield law to exclude an investigatory book author).
281. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.390(4) (2004) (applying the shield law to reporters and defining a “reporter,” as “a person regularly engaged in the business of
collecting or writing news for publication, or presentation to the public,
through a news organization”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-902(a) (defining
a “reporter” covered under the statute as “any person regularly engaged in the
business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news
medium on a full-time or part-time basis”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100
(LexisNexis 2005) (applying the privilege to those “engaged or employed” by
newspaper, radio, or television stations); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451 (1999)
(defining a reporter as “any person regularly engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news media”); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993) (including in the definition of a news-
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employed by a media entity, much less “regularly” employed by
such a company, these state statutes would offer no protection
to even the most widely read blogger.
Other states are more specific in defining what constitutes
regular employment. Delaware’s shield law applies to all reporters—defined rather broadly as “any journalist, scholar,
educator, polemicist, or other individual”282—but requires that
anyone invoking the privilege must have earned their “principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the
preceding 8 weeks [to have] spent at least 20 hours engaged in
the practice of, obtaining, or preparing information for dissemination . . . to the general public.”283 Those seeking protection under Indiana’s statute must prove that they have “received income from legitimate gathering, writing, editing and
interpretation of news.”284 These statutes similarly have the effect of excluding most bloggers and other citizen journalists. Although some bloggers do make money from advertising, and
many spend at least twenty hours a week at their computer,
many others do not, particularly those operating more scholarship-oriented blogs. Many serious bloggers have full-time jobs
that would prohibit them from spending the required twenty
hours a week to qualify under the Delaware statute.
This is not to say that citizen journalists would be out of
luck in every state. In Minnesota, for example, the shield law
applies to any “person who is or has been directly engaged in
the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of
information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or
publication to the public.”285 Minnesota’s statute is not limited
to certain types of news media or to individuals who are employed as reporters. New Jersey’s shield law is similarly broad,
protecting the confidentiality of “an author . . . from or through
whom any information was . . . supplied [or] furnished.”286 Although to date no cases have applied these state shield laws to
citizen journalists using the Internet, these laws appear on
their face to apply to such individuals.

man the condition that he must be “regularly engaged obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing, or otherwise preparing news”).
282. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 4320(4) (1999).
283. Id. § 4320(3)(a).
284. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 1998).
285. MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2004).
286. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21(a) (West 1994).
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B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Justice White expressed concern in his majority opinion in
Branzburg that recognizing a First Amendment privilege would
necessarily require the Court to determine who was entitled to
invoke the privilege.287 Justice White declared, “We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to
such an uncertain destination.”288 Although in the thirty years
since Branzburg most circuits have not been afraid to grapple
with this issue—most commonly embracing an intent standard
not grounded in a particular type of medium—in the past two
years some courts have used the uncertain scope of the privilege as a reason for rejecting its existence entirely under the
First Amendment or federal common law.289
When the Court decided Branzburg, bloggers did not exist,
but the Court was concerned for the “lonely pamphleteer who
uses carbon paper or a mimeograph . . . .”290 The Court said
that the freedom of the press was not limited to “the large metropolitan publisher” but “‘necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets’” and “‘every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion.’”291 The Court recognized that “[t]he
informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers,
political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.”292 In rejecting the privilege, the Branzburg majority
commented:
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of
newsmen who qualified for the privilege—a questionable procedure in
light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of
the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just
as much as of the large, metropolitan publisher . . . .293

In the over thirty years since Branzburg, several courts
have attempted to define who qualifies as a journalist under
the First Amendment. Three circuits have held that the medium should be irrelevant in determining whether the privilege
applies.294 Although none of these cases involved bloggers or
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972).
Id.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
408 U.S. at 704.
Id. (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
Id. at 705.
Id.
See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 129–30 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v.
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the Internet, they are useful starting points and appear to represent the current state of the law with respect to the First
Amendment privilege.
In von Bulow v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit held that
the First Amendment privilege applied only to persons who
have the intent at the inception of the information-gathering
process to disseminate information to the public.295 In this case,
Andrea Reynolds was a third-party witness subpoenaed in a
civil action brought by Martha von Bulow (through her children) against her husband Claus.296 Reynolds had been the
constant companion of Claus von Bulow as he was tried on
criminal charges for killing his wife.297 During the trials, she
took notes and later wrote a book manuscript that had not been
published at the time of the lawsuit.298 The court ultimately rejected Reynolds’s attempts to claim the protection of the reporter’s privilege, but it first emphasized that the medium used
for the dissemination (here, a book) did not matter: “The intended manner of dissemination may be by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, handbill, or the
like, for ‘[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.’”299 In addition, the court, reciting Branzburg’s observation, noted that an individual need not be a member of the
institutionalized press to invoke the reporter’s privilege because “‘[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of
the organized press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political
pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.’”300
The court also held that the privilege was not necessarily limited to those who have a demonstrated history of journalism,
but “prior experience as a professional journalist may be persuasive evidence of present intent to gather for the purpose of
dissemination.”301 The court ultimately concluded that, even
though the witness subsequently undertook the writing of a
manuscript, her materials were still discoverable because she
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d
136, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1987).
295. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144.
296. Id. at 138.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 138, 145–46.
299. Id. at 144 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
300. Id. at 144–45 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972)).
301. Id. at 144.
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did not have the intention of disseminating information to the
public at the time she gathered them.302
In Shoen v. Shoen, the Ninth Circuit found von Bulow persuasive and extended a qualified First Amendment privilege to
a non-fiction writer of investigative books.303 The court explained that “[t]he journalist’s privilege is designed to protect
investigative reporting, regardless of the medium used to report the news to the public. Investigative book authors, like
more conventional reporters, have historically played a vital
role in bringing to light ‘newsworthy’ facts on topical and controversial matters of great public importance.”304 As examples,
the Ninth Circuit cited Lincoln Stefens, Upton Sinclair, Rachel
Carson, Ralph Nader, Jessica Mitford, and Bob Woodward.305
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Second Circuit had set
forth the relevant inquiry: Whether the person seeking to invoke the privilege had the intent at the time of informationgathering to disseminate the information to the public.306
The First Circuit also has adopted the von Bulow intent
test. In Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., the court held:
Whether the creator of the materials is a member of the media or of
the academy, the courts will make a measure of protection available
to him as long as he intended “at the inception of the newsgathering
process” to use the fruits of his research “to disseminate information
to the public.”307

The court applied the privilege to professors who had written a book of interest to Microsoft in its litigation against Net-

302. Id. at 145–46 (“An individual’s ‘memories’ are not privileged by virtue
of the First Amendment merely because, at a later date, those memories are
committed to writing.”). A district court in New York applied von Bulow in
holding that a reporter for a law school newspaper was entitled to a qualified
privilege even though the reporter was not a professional reporter and was not
compensated for his work on the school paper. See Blum v. Schlegel, 150
F.R.D. 42, 44–45 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[W]hether a person is a professional journalist is irrelevant. The question is how the person asserting the privilege intended to use the information gathered.”).
303. 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 21, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (applying the von Bulow test in
holding that George Stephanopoulos was entitled to invoke the reporter’s
privilege).
304. Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1293.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1293–94.
307. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144).
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scape.308 The court explained that academic researchers deserve the benefit of the reporter’s privilege because “[they] too
are information gatherers and disseminators.”309 The court continued, “Just as a journalist, stripped of sources, would write
fewer, less incisive articles, an academician, stripped of
sources, would be able to provide fewer, less cogent analyses.”310
The Third Circuit has adopted a modified, more restrictive
version of the von Bulow test. In In re Madden, the court
agreed that the von Bulow court was correct to require intent to
disseminate to the public at the outset of newsgathering so that
the test would not “grant status to every person with a manuscript, web page, or a film . . . .”311 But the Third Circuit went
on to add an additional element that was not explicitly required
in von Bulow: the person claiming the privilege must be involved in “investigative reporting.”312 The Third Circuit’s modification of the von Bulow test was very likely motivated by the
facts of the case before the court. Mark Madden, the individual
asserting the privilege, was a commentator for a professional
wrestling promoter that produced tape-recorded commentaries
replayed to callers on the promoter’s 900-number hotline.313 He
admitted that although he received information from confidential sources for his commentary, his announcements “are as
much entertainment as journalism.”314 The Third Circuit held
that intent to disseminate to the public was an insufficient basis for the privilege, noting that Madden’s activities bore little
or no resemblance to the investigative reporting that the individuals in the von Bulow and Shoen cases performed.315 The
court explained that what Madden did “cannot be considered
‘reporting,’ let alone ‘investigative reporting.’ By his own admission, he is an entertainer, not a reporter, disseminating
308. Id. at 711, 714.
309. Id. at 714.
310. Id.; cf. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(holding that an academic researcher was not entitled to invoke the privilege
because “[t]he court is not persuaded that the possibility of being subpoenaed
will sufficiently chill writers and researchers to warrant a specific exemption
from the duty to provide evidence”).
311. In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1998).
312. Id. at 129–30.
313. Id. at 126.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 129–30.
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hype, not news.”316 The court added that Madden’s only sources
were executives of the promotion company, and that Madden
“uncovered no story on his own nor did he independently investigate any of the information given to him by WCW executives.”317
The “intent to disseminate” test is an attractive test in
some ways. Its primary appeal lies in its focus on the purpose
of the privilege—to provide protection for the unfettered dissemination of information to the public—rather than on any
other formulistic hallmarks of who qualifies as a journalist.318
But one of the weaknesses of the test is that it focuses on the
intent of the reporter at the time the information was received.
Even veteran reporters of the most established newspapers in
the country would admit that many of their stories come to
them when they are not even looking for them. For example, it
is not clear the von Bulow test would cover a reporter who has
a friendly conversation with an acquaintance and later decides
to pursue a story based on what she learned in that conversation.319 It is also undoubtedly true that reporters often have no
idea at the time they are collecting information whether they
will in fact share that information with the public.320 In Gastman v. North Jersey Newspapers Co., for example, a New Jersey court held that the state’s uncharacteristically broad shield
law protected the confidentiality of the author of an unsolicited
letter published by a newspaper, explaining that the statute
does not require that “the information obtained by the media
must have been actively ‘solicited’ by a newsperson. The Shield
Law accords confidentiality to the ‘source’ of news, whether or
316. Id. at 130.
317. Id.
318. See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987).
319. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Comment, Constitutional Protection for the
Newsman’s Work Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 132 (1970). This
work predated the von Bulow decision by seventeen years, but its analysis is
remarkably prescient on this point.
320. See id. (“[A]n ordinary conversation can—after the fact—be transformed into a protected newsman-informant conversation.”). It is also not clear
whether the von Bulow intent test would protect a conversation between a
journalist and source who is giving information on “deep background” (in other
words, not for public dissemination). During an interview with a deep background source, the journalist does not have the intent to disseminate the contents of that conversation to the public, even if she does have a general intent
to disseminate information to the public, or information on the same topic to
the public.
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not the information was requested or voluntarily given.”321 The
von Bulow test, clearly intended to screen out opportunistic individuals who “conveniently” characterize themselves as journalists to avail themselves of the privilege, could also have the
effect of denying the privilege to even the most established and
dedicated full-time journalists.
C. OTHER SUGGESTED APPROACHES
1. Exclude Citizen Journalists
Some have suggested that bloggers and other citizen journalists simply should be excluded from the benefits of a reporter’s privilege. In an editorial in the L.A. Times, David Shaw
argued that “the nation’s estimated 8 million bloggers are not
entitled to the same constitutional protection as traditional
journalists—essentially newspaper, magazine, radio and television reporters and editors.”322 Shaw argued that bloggers have
no journalistic training or experience, and instead “[a]ll they
need is computer access and the desire to blog.”323 He complained that unlike mainstream journalists, bloggers do not
care about being fair or accurate. Instead, Shaw argued, “[t]hey
just want to get their opinions—and their ‘scoops’—out there as
fast as they pop into their brains.”324
Shaw’s suggestion that bloggers should not be permitted to
invoke the reporter’s privilege has some facial appeal because it
allows us to side-step the issue entirely. As explained above,
many state statutes explicitly apply only to traditional media
entities. Unfortunately, this sort of distinction is clearly outdated.
Shaw’s approach reveals a misplaced hostility toward the
new citizen journalists. Shaw claimed that bloggers are not entitled to the privilege because they are not trained, they do not
work as journalists full-time, and they are not sufficiently dedicated to contributing to the public debate.325 This criticism
rings particularly hollow at a time when the mainstream media
321. Gastman v. N. Jersey Newspapers Co., 603 A.2d 111, 133 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992).
322. David Shaw, Media Matters: Do Bloggers Deserve Basic Journalistic
Protections?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at E14.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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organizations have substantially eroded their own credibility
with the Jayson Blair, Steven Glass, and Dan Rather scandals,
while bloggers have been breaking stories and driving the national conversation. In addition, it fails to recognize that citizen
journalists have every incentive to be accurate and dedicated in
order to gain credibility with their readers. As is the case with
traditional communication media, some enterprises are more
successful than others in obtaining the trust and loyalty of
their audience.
Online communications are going to gain influence in the
future. The number of adults obtaining their news online has
been dramatically increasing and shows no signs of stopping as
more Americans gain Internet access, especially through highspeed Internet connections. In 2000, eighteen percent of adults
received political news online; in 2004, the percentage had
climbed to twenty-nine percent.326 In 2005, seventy-six percent
of teens received their news online.327
Making distinctions based on the medium of communication also runs into severe equal protection problems that have
largely been ignored by the courts328 and have been mentioned
only in passing by commentators. As one rare court to recognize
this problem stated,
[I]t would be difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special
constitutional rights for those possessing credentials as news gatherers which would not conflict with the equal-privileges and equalprotection concepts also found in the Constitution. Freedom of the
press is a right which belongs to the public; it is not the private preserve of those who possess the implements of publishing.329

Some have suggested that the person asserting the right
should have to demonstrate some sort of “bona fides,” such as
membership in a group or organization (whose function is to

326. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AND CAM2004, at 2 (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_2004_
campaign.pdf (“The online political news consumer population grew dramatically from previous election years (up from 18% of the U.S. population in 2000
to 29% in 2004).”).
327. Journalism.org, Project for Excellence in Journalism, State of the
News Media 2006: Audience, http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2006/
narrative_online_audience.asp?cat=3&media=4 (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
328. But see Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 586–88 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the Michigan shield law that applied to print media but not broadcast
media and holding that such a distinction was “rational”).
329. State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (Or. 1967) (footnote omitted).
PAIGN

PAPANDREA_4FMT

2007]

2/16/2007 9:57:45 AM

CITIZEN JOURNALISM

575

obtain information for the purpose of public dissemination), or
perhaps formal training, experience, or credentials.330 Although
this approach may have some facial appeal as a means of dividing the “real” journalists from the armchair diarists, it is much
too close to “licensing” of journalists to pass constitutional muster.
Another way of limiting the privilege might be to require a
certain level of circulation or to require any individual claiming
the privilege to show that she was paid money for her publication. Although these requirements may also seem like reasonable ways of limiting the privilege, they are also inconsistent
with fundamental First Amendment principles. No state currently conditions the privilege on circulation levels, but some
used to do so. For example, Indiana’s shield law required a reporter to be “connected with a weekly, semiweekly, triweekly,
or daily newspaper . . . which shall have been published for
five . . . consecutive years in the same city or town and which
has a paid circulation of two percent (2%) of the population of
the county in which it is published.”331 This circulation requirement meant that only older, established newspapers could
receive the privilege, and any publications that published less
than once a week were excluded. In 1998, Indiana amended its
law to cover all newspapers and periodicals “issued at regular
intervals and having a general circulation.”332
Predicating the privilege on raw circulation numbers cannot be the determining factor; requiring that the content be
available to the general public, however, is essential. After all,
the purpose of providing a privilege is to preserve more open,
free debate. The Federal Election Commission’s “press exception” relies on this requirement: in order to qualify for an exemption from campaign finance laws, an entity’s materials
must be available to the general public.333

330. See, e.g., Barry P. MacDonald, The First Amendment and the Free
Flow of Information, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 250 (2004) (“Probably the most reliable indicator that a person seeking information was doing so for the purpose
of disseminating it to the public would be their membership in a group or organization whose recognized function was to obtain information for the purpose of public dissemination.”).
331. IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1733 (LexisNexis 1968) (repealed 1971).
332. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (LexisNexis 1998).
333. Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Op. 2005-16, at 7–8 (Nov. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.fec.gov/aos/2005/ao2005-16final.pdf (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986)); Fed. Elec-
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Conditioning the privilege upon proof that the individual
earns money from her publications is also unjustified.334 An essential tenet of the First Amendment is that publications are
not entitled to—nor deprived of—First Amendment protection
simply because they make—or do not make—money.335 The
more unpopular the speaker, the less likely that speaker is able
to make any money, much less a substantial sum of money,
from her publications. Many legitimate publications, such as
college newspapers and underground publications, often make
no money at all, or make money only through advertisements
and have reporters and editors who work for free.336
One tempting possibility would be to condition the privilege on the record of accuracy that the individual or entity
claiming the privilege has demonstrated. But in modern First
Amendment jurisprudence, accuracy is relevant only in defamation actions, and even then there is no strict liability for
falsehoods. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, false defamatory speech about a public official receives some protection
under the “actual malice” standard: unless the defendant publishes the alleged defamation with knowledge of its falsity, or
with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity, the defamation
is not actionable.337 In granting protection to such speech, the
Court noted that “erroneous statement[s are] inevitable in free
debate, and that [they] must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to
survive.’”338 The Court quoted its prior decision in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, in which it protected the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to play religious records on a public street, even if some
people found the records offensive:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have

tion Comm’n, Advisory Op. 2000-13 (June 23, 2000), available at http://ao
.nictusa.com/ao/no/200013.html).
334. Sherman, supra note 319, at 131.
335. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
336. The author was a reporter and editor for the Yale Daily News, and the
only reimbursement she ever received was in the form of free pizza.
337. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
338. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.339

Making the privilege depend upon the publication’s reputation for accuracy would be contrary to the fundamental principles set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan. An accuracy requirement would be particularly troubling in the context of
blogging, where the benefits of the medium do not come from
complete accuracy of each posting but rather its interactive nature with readers and critics.
Furthermore, although some have argued that society has
more carefully screened other professionals entitled to invoke
testimonial privileges, such as attorneys and doctors, there are
others—most notably the clergy—whose testimonial privilege
invokes constitutional concerns that render government screening virtually impossible.340 Over the years states have taken a
broader view of who constitutes a clergy member and what services constitute spiritual advising; this expansion is partly due
to a growing respect for a greater diversity of religions.341 Accordingly, the mere fact that greater numbers of people are now
able to claim the protection of the reporter’s privilege should
not warrant its demise.

339. Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
340. See D’Alemberte, supra note 122123, at 325. (noting that government
screening for the clergy/penitent privilege would raise “serious constitutional
questions”).
341. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1627, 1630–31 (2003). The expansion of the penitent/cleric privilege is
also partly due to respect for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment. Id. States have a wide variety of definitions concerning
who constitutes a cleric for purposes of their statutes. Although some simply
privilege confidential communications with priests or members of the clergy
without defining those terms, others are based on the bona fides of the minister or the church. Id. at 1653–56. Some states require an “established” or “legally recognizable” religion; others protect designated clergy including priests,
rabbis, ministers, nuns, and other “similar functionar[ies].” Id. at 1654–57.
The broadest statutes protect communications with persons “reasonably believed” by the congregant to be religious clerics. Id. at 1656. As with the reporter’s privilege, states have struggled to limit the cleric/penitent privilege so
that cult leaders or self-proclaimed ministers of “sham” religions cannot benefit from it. Id. at 1654–58.
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2. Limit Privilege to Publications on Matters of Public
Concern
Some scholars have suggested that the reporter’s privilege
should be available only to those who publish information involving matters of public concern, typically of a governmental
or political nature.342 While this approach initially seems appealing, the administrative and theoretical difficulties of such a
rule are insurmountable.
Professor Laurence Alexander proposed that the privilege
should not be available “to persons who gather information for
entertainment or non-dissemination purposes, including hobby,
recreation, sport, personal use, promotion or sale of a product
or service.”343 Alexander would define “journalist” to include
“any person who is engaged in gathering news for public presentation or dissemination by the news media.”344 “News” is defined as “information of public interest or concern relating to
local, statewide, national or worldwide issues or events,” and
“news media” is defined as “newspapers, magazines, television,
and radio stations, online news services, or any other regularly
published news outlet used for the public dissemination of
news.”345 Alexander’s suggestion finds its roots in several state
statutes that take a similar approach.346
Making legal distinctions based on whether the content is
a matter of public concern or newsworthy has posed significant
342. See, e.g., Kraig L. Baker, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists? Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the Journalist’s Privilege, 69
WASH. L. REV. 739, 750 (1994) (noting that courts seem to require a public interest in the material); MacDonald, supra note 330, at 251.
343. Alexander, supra note 141, at 130.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a)–(b) (2005) (limiting the privilege to those
who are “regularly engaged in collecting, photographing, recording, writing,
editing, reporting, or publishing news” and defining “news” as “information of
public concern relating to local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues or
events”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1459(a) (1999) (defining “news” as “any
written, oral, pictorial, photographic, electronic, or other information or communication, whether or not recorded, concerning local, national, or worldwide
events or other matters of public concern or public interest or affecting the
public welfare”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(a)(8) (McKinney 1992) (defining
“news” as “written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or electronically recorded information or communication concerning local, national or worldwide events or
other matters of public concern or public interest or affecting the public welfare”).
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difficulties in a number of different areas of media law. In the
context of defamation law, the Supreme Court spent over fifteen years attempting to resolve whether it is appropriate to
rest the applicability of the actual malice standard on an inquiry into whether the challenged statements involve a matter
of public concern. Ultimately, the Court decided that whether
the case involved a matter of public concern is an important
consideration, at least in cases involving private figures.347
Throughout the series of cases in which the Court discussed
this issue—from the fractured Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.348 to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.349 and Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.350—various Justices expressed
concern that such an inquiry would put the Court in the dangerous position of deciding “what information is relevant to
self-government,”351 and would subject “the press to judicial
second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item they
print.”352 As Justice Douglas noted in his dissenting opinion in
Gertz, determining what constitutes a matter of public concern
is no easy task. Justice Douglas explained that “‘public affairs’
includes a great deal more than merely political affairs. Matters of science, economics, business, art, literature, etc., are all
matters of interest to the general public. Indeed, any matter of
sufficient general interest to prompt media coverage may be
said to be a public affair.”353
The difficulty of determining what constitutes a matter of
public concern was apparent in Dun & Bradstreet.354 In that
347. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
(1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (holding that the
actual malice standard applied to presumed and punitive damages claims in
private figure cases involving matters of public concern).
348. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
349. 418 U.S. 323.
350. 472 U.S. 749.
351. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
353. 418 U.S. at 357 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
354. A majority of the Justices also held that the applicable fault standard
did not depend on whether the defendant was part of the institutional press.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
781–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the Court’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), cast some doubt on this
holding by making a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants
with respect to the burden of proving truth or falsity, lower courts have consistently applied the actual malice standard without regard to the status of the
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particular case, a plurality of the Court held that the defamatory statements at issue, a credit report falsely stating that a
business was bankrupt, was not a matter of public concern.355
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, joined by three other
members of the Court, expressed dismay with the Court’s conclusion that a business’s credit report is not a matter of public
concern, noting that even if a credit report is not “at ‘the essence of self-government,’” economic issues are still important
for the public welfare.356 Justice Brennan also criticized Justice
Powell’s determination that the report was a not a matter of
public concern because it was not widely disseminated.357 As
one scholar has noted, it makes little sense to say that a false
report that a company is bankrupt is not a matter of public
concern when published to a small percentage of subscribers
but that it would be a matter of public concern if published in a
newspaper with a broader circulation.358
The Dun & Bradstreet court failed to give any guidance on
how to determine whether a statement is a matter of public
concern, and, perhaps as a result, the distinction between matters of public and private concern has not proven particularly
useful. Since Dun & Bradstreet was decided, very few published
statements have been held to be matters of private concern.359
It would seem unwise to adopt a “public concern” standard in
the context of the reporter’s privilege as part of an effort to
limit the scope of the privilege when that standard has proven
to be ineffective in defamation actions.
A newsworthiness standard would prove equally unworkable because it involves essentially the same inquiry as a “public concern” test. A newsworthiness inquiry is common in the
defendant. See SACK, supra note 223, § 5.3.10.
355. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757–63. Justice Powell’s opinion was
joined by two other Justices. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White wrote
separate concurring opinions in which they both agreed that the credit report
was not a matter of public concern. See id. at 764 (Burger, J., concurring); id.
at 774 (White, J., concurring).
356. Id. at 794 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
357. Id. at 786 n.6.
358. See SACK, supra note 223, § 1.2.7 & n.125; see also Albert v. Loksen,
239 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting how rare it is for New York courts to
determine that something is not a matter of public concern).
359. See SACK, supra note 223, § 1.2.7 & n.123. Instead, the more important distinction in actual litigation is whether the plaintiff is a public, quasipublic, or private figure.
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context of privacy tort actions.360 As with the public concern inquiry in defamation actions, the newsworthiness inquiry in privacy claims has been equally ineffectual. For example, in one
famous California state case, the court held that a woman injured in a car accident had no claim for publication of private
facts against the television studio that filmed her rescue. The
court explained,
Automobiles are by their nature of interest to that great portion of the
public that travels frequently by automobile. The rescue and medical
treatment of accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of
the public, involving as it does a critical service that any member of
the public may someday need.361

Even under this test, matters of public concern are not limited to publications that involved public affairs; they include
“any matter of public concern, including the accomplishments,
everyday lives, and romantic involvements of famous people.”362
The category of speech that could be positively excluded from
the category of public concern or newsworthy would be so small
as to be inconsequential in the effort to reign in the reporter’s
privilege.
Indeed, in the recent Apple Computer case, a California
appellate court rejected any attempts to declare information
about new home recording software as not newsworthy.363 In
that case, the court was particularly concerned with attempts
to label technological disclosures newsworthy or nonnewsworthy, noting that “[i]t is often impossible to predict with
confidence which technological changes will affect individual
and collective life dramatically, and which will come and go
without lasting effects.”364
3. Various Functional Approaches
Some scholars have advocated more “functional” approaches to the privilege, similar to the von Bulow test discussed in Part III.B that several courts of appeals have

360. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal.
1998).
361. Id. at 488.
362. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (discussing the definition of “newsworthy” in the context of privacy
tort actions).
363. See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1478 (Ct. App.
2006).
364. Id. at 1479.
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adopted. The obvious appeal of these approaches is that they
attempt to identify the underlying purpose of the reporter’s
privilege and avoid limiting the privilege to those who are employed by mainstream media or who publish information on
matters of public concern.
Professor Geoffrey Stone has suggested that the identity of
a source should be protected “whenever [the source] makes a
confidential disclosure to an individual, reasonably believing
that that individual regularly disseminates information to the
general public, when the source’s purpose is to enable that individual to disseminate the information to the general public.”365 This test resembles the approach several states have
taken for defining the cleric/penitent privilege by focusing on
whether a person is “reasonably believed” by the parishioner to
be a religious cleric.366
Professor Stone’s approach appropriately rejects the need
for professional association with a mainstream media organization and instead would extend the privilege to many citizen
journalists. The downfall of this approach, however, is its practical application. Such an approach depends entirely on the
subjective views of the confidential source, but Professor Stone
does not explain how a court would determine the beliefs of a
source whose identity is unknown. The journalist would have to
identify the source in order for a judge to question the source—
presumably in secret in camera proceedings. This practical
problem does not exist when trying to determine whether a parishioner “reasonably believed” a person was a religious cleric
for purposes of the cleric/penitent privilege. In such a case, only
the communications are claimed to be confidential, not the
identity of the parishioner.
Other scholars have suggested more workable functional
approaches that essentially ask whether the individual claiming the privilege acts like a journalist. The most attractive approach is one suggested by Professor Linda Berger, who has argued that the privilege should be afforded to anyone who is
engaged in the “journalistic work process.”367 Berger identifies
365. GEOFFREY R. STONE, THE MERITS OF THE PROPOSED JOURNALISTSOURCE PRIVILEGE 10 (2005), http://www.acslaw.org/files/2005%20programs_
Stone_white%20paper.pdf.
366. See Cassidy, supra note 341, at 1656 (explaining that Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin define the
cleric/penitent privilege in this way).
367. Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journal-
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three essential elements of that process: regular and public dissemination; the presence of internal verification measures; and
transparency regarding the owner or sponsor of the publication
and the editorial standards that are followed.368 This approach
is based on a desire to expand the category of those eligible to
invoke the privilege beyond mainstream journalists, while
keeping the courts out of difficult and subjective questions such
as those discussed above.369
Functional approaches like the one Professor Berger has
proposed face three criticisms. First, they are based on the assumption that in order to maintain the reporter’s privilege, it is
necessary to continue to protect only those whose contribution
to the public debate resemble those of the “ideal” journalist who
is part of traditional, mainstream media. Although it is desirable for all of those who contribute to public debate to have
verification procedures, regular dissemination (rather than the
haphazard publication of many online contributors), and transparency of ownership, motives, and editorial standards, regrettably even some professional journalists eschew these guidelines. In addition, it is often impossible to know what those
editorial standards or biases are. Some mainstream media outlets do not have any published editorial guidelines and depend
instead on vague ideas of the appropriate editorial process and
on informal training of reporters.370 Many others who have
been held eligible to invoke the privilege—such as book authors, documentary filmmakers, and scholars—do not have editorial guidelines and would be hard-pressed to articulate them
if asked to do so. Even more fundamentally, it is not clear
whether a court applying a functional test would ask whether
the subpoenaed reporter generally follows editorial guidelines,
or whether any such guidelines were followed in a particular
case.
Second, functional approaches like the one Professor Berger suggests unconstitutionally interfere with the editorial
process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected requests to
interfere with the editorial control and judgment over the
ism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication,
39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1411–12 (2003).
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1406.
370. See Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless
Disregard for Truth in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 887, 898–99 (2005).
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“choice of material to go into a newspaper . . . [and] the treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair.”371 Requiring publishers to have certain procedures in
place in order to invoke the reporter’s privilege would constitute that very same sort of interference.
The third problem with these functional approaches is that
they expand the universe of persons and entities that are entitled to invoke the reporter’s privilege without addressing the
underlying scope of any such privilege. In order to assess the
impact of broadening the category of those entitled to invoke
the privilege, one must consider when the privilege is most
likely to be invoked and when it is in most direct competition
with the public interest.
IV. A NEW COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
Although throughout the last sixty years legislatures and
courts have been expanding the types of media covered by the
reporter’s privilege to include new technologies such as radio,
television, magazines, and films, the development of the Internet requires more than simply adding “electronic communications” to the list of covered forms of communication. The development of the Internet has challenged traditional journalism—
for better and for worse—by encouraging and supporting the
flourishing of citizen journalism. It is time to rethink the reporter’s privilege in light of all of the changes and challenges
this new medium brings.
This Article proposes a rather radical approach to the reporter’s privilege issue: let everyone who disseminates information to the public have a presumptive qualified right to refuse
to testify in any judicial or administrative proceeding concerning the identity of their sources and any other published or unpublished information they have gathered, received, or processed. A qualified privilege can be overcome by showing (1) the
desired information is critical to the maintenance of a party’s
claim, defense, or proof of an issue; (2) the information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means; and (3) there is a
compelling interest in the information that outweighs the public’s interest in the free flow of information.

371. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding
that a right-of-reply statute unconstitutionally “intrud[es] into the function of
editors”).
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Although this standard would protect confidential and
nonconfidential sources as well as published and unpublished
information, the public’s interest in protecting nonconfidential
sources and published information should be given less
weight.372 Forcing the unmasking of a nonconfidential source is
less likely to discourage that source from speaking to a journalist in the future; similarly, giving less protection to published
information often simply requires the writer to authenticate
her publication.
In addition to recognizing a qualified, rather than absolute
privilege, to soften the blow of an expansive definition of those
persons and entities entitled to invoke it, the privilege should
be defeated if a party seeking the information proves that the
case falls within one of the following exceptions: (1) the subpoena is directed to someone who witnessed or participated in
criminal or tortious activity (excluding the crime of leaks of
classified or national security information); (2) compelling testimony is warranted by a direct and imminent threat to national security; (3) the subpoena is directed to a person or entity that is a defendant in a defamation or invasion of privacy
action, provided that the plaintiff makes a certain showing of
necessity and likelihood of success; or (4) the subpoena is directed at an individual who engaged in publication solely in an
effort to avoid a subpoena.
This approach embraces a broad view of the privilege’s
purpose: to encourage sources to come forward with information for public debate while, at the same time, preventing both
professional and nonprofessional journalists from becoming
agents of the government, criminal defendants, or civil litigants.
(1) The privilege applies to any individual who disseminates
information to the general public
This Article proposes that anyone who disseminates information to the public should be presumptively entitled to the
privilege. Because the privilege is intended to protect those who
are contributing information to the public debate, those who
are not participating in this debate are not entitled to the privilege’s protection.

372. This standard is consistent with the approach many states and federal
courts have taken. See supra Parts II.B–C.
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Although this approach would allow a broad category of individuals to assert a privilege, it would by no means permit
everyone to claim its protection. The important limitation is
that the individual must communicate information “to the public.” Admittedly, this limitation is not significant; anyone contributing information to a public chat room, Wikipedia, an
online magazine or newspaper, youtube.com, or a blog open to
all readers—and intended to be read by the general public—
would be entitled to invoke the presumptive privilege.
(2) Special treatment of defamation and invasion of privacy
actions where the subpoenaed party is the defendant
This Article proposes that the individuals who disseminate
information to the public should have qualified immunity from
subpoenas in civil actions. An extra layer of protection should
apply in defamation actions where the reporter or citizen journalist (or a media entity) is a defendant.
Many state shield laws either exempt or treat separately
defamation actions, and there is good reason for this distinction. Without being able to learn about the newsgathering
process or the identity of an unnamed source, a plaintiff may
find it impossible to demonstrate the necessary level of fault
(typically actual malice or negligence).373
That said, an extra level of protection should apply in
defamation cases. Allowing plaintiffs to force journalists to reveal their sources based on a mere allegation of defamation
would unduly chill publication. It is very easy for a plaintiff to
allege a claim for defamation; however, given all the constitutional and common law protections free speech enjoys, it is
much harder for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. If the courts apply a low standard for obtaining the identity of an anonymous source, a
plaintiff who would have difficulty proving the elements of his
or her case would still be in a position to obtain some form of
relief by unmasking the source and engaging in various forms
of extra-judicial retribution. Furthermore, defamation cases are
very often dismissed based on the application of various privilege doctrines (such as the fair report privilege) or the truth of

373. See, e.g., Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1343–45 (11th Cir. 2005)
(discussing how the balance shifts towards disclosure in defamation cases
against parties claiming privilege).
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the published statements, neither of which require the court to
determine whether the publisher acted with the requisite fault.
Many states concerned about these issues require a journalist (or publisher) to reveal the identity of a source for an allegedly defamatory article only if: (1) the case has survived a
motion to dismiss (or the state procedural equivalent); (2) the
requested information goes to the heart of the litigant’s case;
and (3) the litigant has exhausted all other means of obtaining
the information.374 This approach adequately protects a plaintiff ’s right to receive information essential to her case while
protecting journalists from frivolous litigation brought solely to
uncover their sources.
(3) Witness to or participant in a crime
Under this exception, journalists who are witnesses to or
participate in criminal or tortious activity are ineligible to invoke the privilege.375 Many courts have held that a reporter’s
privilege does not protect a reporter who observes or participates in criminal or tortious conduct, or that even if a privilege
does apply, the public’s interests in the testimony outweigh the
reporter’s interest in the privilege.376 Thus, under this exception, reporter Paul Branzburg (from the eponymous case377),
who interviewed and took pictures of individuals using drugs,
would not be eligible to invoke the reporter’s privilege when
subpoenaed to testify in any proceeding about what he had
seen. This exception would also apply in cases involving a subpoenaed party who witnessed a crime or tortious activity, and
to people who are engaged in criminal activity themselves.378
This exception would do no damage to the underlying purpose
of the privilege because there is no value in encouraging
sources to commit crimes in front of journalists.
The crime exception should not apply, however, to individuals who witness the “crime” of leaking classified or national
374. See supra note 172.
375. See supra notes 186, 197 and accompanying text; see also Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, but You Can’t Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A39
(suggesting a crime/fraud exception to the privilege).
376. See supra Part II.B.2.
377. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
378. See, e.g., Daniel Henninger, When Blogs Rule We Will All Talk
Like - - - -, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2006, at A14 (noting that Oklahoma cannibal
Kevin Ray Underwood kept a blog detailing his compulsions before killing a
ten-year-old neighbor).
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security information.379 As discussed in Part II.A.2, leaks of
government information, whether classified or not, have become an essential means by which the public learns about government activities. Currently, protections for whistleblowers
are inadequate, and as a result, leaking information to the
press is often the only realistic means of shedding light on
questionable or illegal government practices. Although not all
leaks serve the public interest, many leaks do. Protecting the
identity of the small minority who leak information that does
not serve the public interest is a minor price to pay to encourage the majority of government whistleblowers to come forward, especially when so often the information is improperly
classified in the first place.
In any event, the government does not necessarily need to
abolish the reporter’s privilege to retain the ability to prevent
leaks and to prosecute past or present government employees
who leak national security or other classified information. The
government can hardly blame the reporter’s privilege for the
leaks concerning its secret actions. It is only recently that the
federal government has begun subpoenaing reporters in leak
investigations, and there is no credible evidence that the reporter’s privilege has undermined national security in any significant way. If the leaks have been increasing in the last few
years, it is more likely due to the fact that this administration
has been engaging in questionable practices and because it has
not tolerated criticism of those practices through official government channels. Restricting the government’s ability to subpoena journalists simply forces the prosecutors to work a bit
harder to identify the leakers.
(4) Exception for direct and imminent threat to national
security or the reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm of another human being
In congressional hearings on proposed federal shield laws,
some legislators and government officials have expressed concern that a federal shield law would undermine national secu379. This limitation is the major difference between the crime/fraud exception this Article proposes and the one Eugene Volokh suggested in his editorial
You Can Blog, but You Can’t Hide. Supra note 375. Professor Volokh did not
grapple with the problem of excessive government secrecy and inadequate protection for national security whistleblowers; instead, he merely suggested that
Congress could pass laws to protect those who “lawfully reveal information.”
Id.
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rity.380 As discussed above, such concerns are largely misplaced. To the extent, however, that a reporter’s testimony
would help prevent a direct and imminent threat to national
security or the threat of reasonably certain death or serious
bodily harm to another human being, the privilege should give
way. The first prong of this exception for imminent threat to
national security is in keeping with the exception to the prior
restraint doctrine articulated in the Pentagon Papers case, New
York Times v. United States.381 Although the Pentagon Papers
decision is marked by several separate opinions, the conclusion
of a majority of the Justices was that a presumption against
prior restraints could not be overridden absent an immediate
and serious threat to national security.382 The same standard
should apply to this exception, especially given the government’s propensity to exaggerate or manufacture a threat to national security. In the context of the reporter’s privilege, this
exception might come into play if a reporter has knowledge of
the location and timing of a ticking bomb.383
An exception for preventing death or serious bodily harm
to another human being applies to other testimonial privileges,
including the attorney/client privilege.384 It is sensible to ex-

380. See Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law
Enforcement: Hearing on S. 2831 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Paul McNaulty, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Virginia).
381. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
382. See id. at 714 (holding that the government did not meet its “heavy
burden” of showing that enjoining publication was justified); id. at 714–18
(Black J., concurring) (opining that prior restraints are never justified); id. at
726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]nly governmental allegation and proof
that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea
can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.”); id. at 730
(Stewart J., concurring) (concluding that the government had failed to show
that publication of the Pentagon Papers would lead to “direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to the Nation or its people”).
383. In reality, it is hard to imagine that a reporter would not reveal the
location of a ticking time bomb, but this is the sort of scenario presented by
those opposing a federal shield law.
384. CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West 1995) (permitting lawyers to make disclosures to prevent criminal acts that may result in death or bodily harm);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006) (“A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”). This exception often overlaps with the crime/fraud ex-
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tend this exception to the reporter’s privilege because in such
cases the public’s interest in the information far outweighs the
public’s interest in encouraging anonymous sources from coming forward.
(5) No privilege for persons who publish information for the
purpose of avoiding a subpoena
One of the biggest red herrings raised by those concerned
about “pajama-clad bloggers” is that people who are subpoenaed—or who think they will be subpoenaed—will simply create a blog in order to invoke the reporter’s privilege. The first
response to this claim is to note how misleading it is. As discussed above, witnesses to or participants in criminal or tortious activity—the people most likely to create a “sham” website to avoid testifying—would not be able to avoid testifying by
creating a blog or by talking to another blogger or citizen journalist.
To the extent that expanding the reporter’s privilege to include anyone who disseminates information to the public might
lead to abuse of the privilege, states and courts should simply
recognize an exception to the privilege that would take care of
this situation. Anyone who suddenly publishes information on
the Internet for the first time soon before or after receiving a
subpoena and who cannot convince a court that he or she would
have published the information absent a subpoena threat
would be subject to this exception.
CONCLUSION
The reporter’s privilege developed during the last century
in attempts to preserve the free-flow of information to the public. With the evolution of the Internet and other technologies,
the universe of people who can contribute information to the
public debate has greatly expanded. The line between traditional media and citizen journalists continues to blur as both
take advantage of all the possibilities the Internet has to offer.
Americans increasingly obtain their information and insights
into important issues through the Internet and through bloggers in particular, pajama-clad or otherwise. To continue to
limit the reporter’s privilege to traditional media outlets and

ception, at least when the future crime or fraud at issue threatens to cause
death or substantial bodily harm.
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professional journalists would unrealistically ignore how the
public obtains its information today.
This Article suggests that any articulation of the reporter’s
privilege must account for this changing nature of journalism.
Given that the institutional press no longer has a monopoly
over the dissemination of information to the public, all those
who disseminate information to the public must be presumptively entitled to invoke the privilege’s protections. In turn, the
privilege itself must adapt so as to lessen the dangers posed by
an expansive definition of who is considered a journalist. By
providing only a qualified privilege, any privilege claim can be
overcome if a sufficient showing is made. At the same time, the
existence of the privilege will deter prosecutors, defendants,
and litigants from subpoenaing those contributing to the public
debate unless it is necessary to do so. Remaining concerns that
an expansive category of citizen journalists would wreak havoc
on our judicial system can be alleviated through recognizing
limited exceptions to a qualified privilege. Such an approach
appropriately reconciles our society’s fundamental interest in
vigorous, informed public debate with our equally fundamental
interests in fairness and justice.

